Essays on Energy and Regulatory Compliance by Cancho Diez, Cesar
ESSAYS ON ENERGY AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
A Dissertation
by
CESAR ALFREDO THEODORO CANCHO DIEZ
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
August 2012
Major Subject: Economics
ESSAYS ON ENERGY AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
A Dissertation
by
CESAR ALFREDO THEODORO CANCHO DIEZ
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved by:
Chair of Committee, Steven L. Puller
Committee Members, Steven N. Wiggins
Stephanie A. Houghton
Lori L. Taylor
Head of Department, Timothy J. Gronberg
August 2012
Major Subject: Economics
iii
ABSTRACT
Essays on Energy and Regulatory Compliance. (August 2012)
Cesar Alfredo Theodoro Cancho Diez, B.S., Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Steven L. Puller
This dissertation contains two essays on the analysis of market imperfections. In
the first essay, I empirically test whether in a three-level hierarchy more competition
among intermediaries leads to more deception against the principal. In this setting,
intermediaries supervise agents by delegation of the principal, and compete among
themselves to provide supervision services to the agents. They cannot be perfectly
monitored, therefore allowing them to manipulate supervision results in favor of the
agents, and potentially leading to less than optimal outcomes for the principal. Using
inspection-level data from the vehicular inspection program in Atlanta, I test for the
existence of inspection deception (false positives), and whether this incidence is a
function of the number of local competitors by station. I estimate the incidence of the
most common form of false positives (clean piping) to be 9% of the passing inspections
during the sample period. Moreover, the incidence of clean piping – passing results of
a different vehicle fraudulently applied to a failing vehicle – per station increases by
0.7% with one more competitor within a 0.5 mile radius. These results are consistent
with the presence of more competitors exacerbating the perverse incentives introduced
by competition under this setting.
In the second essay, we test whether electricity consumption by industrial and
commercial customers responds to real-time prices after these firms sign-up for prices
linked to the electricity wholesale market price. In principle, time-varying prices
(TVP) can mitigate market power in wholesale markets and promote the integra-
tion of intermittent generation sources such as wind and solar power. However, little
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is known about the prevalence of TVP, especially in deregulated retail markets where
customers can choose whether to adopt TVP, and how these firms change their con-
sumption after signing up for this type of tariff. We study firm-level data on com-
mercial and industrial customers in Texas, and estimate the magnitude of demand
responsiveness using demand equations that consider the restrictions imposed by the
microeconomic theory. We find a meaningful level of take-up of TVP – in some sectors
more than one-quarter of customers signed up for TVP. Nevertheless, the estimated
price responsiveness of consumption is still small. Estimations by size and by type
of industry show that own price elasticities are in most cases below 0.01 in absolute
value. In the only cases that own price elasticities reach 0.02 in absolute value, the
magnitude of demand response compared to the aggregate demand is negligible.
vTo my father, Alfredo Cancho Garayar.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation contains two essays on the analysis of market imperfections. In the
first essay, I analyze the effect that the market structure may have over the behavior
of market participants. The setting I study is a three-level hierarchy, with a principal
that delegates the supervision of agents to intermediary firms. These intermediaries
compete among themselves to provide the supervision service to agents. They have
an informational advantage over the principal, and they can collude with the agents
to deceive the principal by obtaining false positive results from the supervision. Con-
sidering a setting as the described, I study whether collusion exists and how extended
is it by testing for the existence of one form of test manipulation in a vehicular emis-
sion inspection program (Atlanta, GA) designed as a three-level hierarchy. I am also
interested in answering the question of whether the incidence of deception by sta-
tion is affected by the number of local competitors, which constitutes a metric of
the intensity of competition. The results will provide empirical evidence about the
strength of perverse incentives in settings where competition is introduced to improve
the outcomes from the provision of government services, as is the case of outsourcing
of certification and supervision capacity.
In Chapter III, I test whether the patterns of electricity consumption vary after
customers decide to sign-up for real-time prices. In the setting I study, industrial and
commercial customers have the option to sign-up for prices linked to the electricity
wholesale market price, which varies every 15 minutes. Time-varying prices (TVP)
have the potential to make total demand for electricity more elastic and thus reduce
This dissertation follows the style of the American Economic Review.
2market power in wholesale electricity markets. In addition, TVP can promote the
integration of intermittent generation sources such as wind and solar power, by intro-
ducing incentives to curtail demand when unexpected changes in the production of
electricity from these sources occur. However, little is known about the prevalence of
TVP, especially in deregulated retail markets where customers can choose whether to
adopt TVP, and how these firms change their consumption after signing up for this
type of tariff. Using firm-level data on commercial and industrial customers in Texas,
we are interested in studying how meaningful is the level of take-up of TVP, and
what the magnitude of the response to electricity prices is for signed-up firms. The
results will contribute to a growing literature about the effect of real-time prices on
electricity consumption by residential, industrial and commercial firms, and provide
some guidance to policy makers about the potential of sign-up programs to induce
demand responsiveness.
3CHAPTER II
FRAUD AND MARKET COMPETITION IN THE EMISSION INSPECTION
MARKET
A. Introduction
Governmental entities often outsource the provision of public services, such as garbage
and recyclable materials collection, fire protection, and prison management to com-
mercial contractors. Vehicle emission certification capacity delegated to private in-
spection stations is one of this cases. After passage of the Clean Air Act of 1990,
vehicle inspection stations tested vehicle tailpipe emissions as one facet of a multi-
pronged approach to curbinng air pollution. A number of states adopted decentral-
ized, privately operated inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs affording car
owners the freedom of choice of inspection stations. Under this model, competition
would keep the cost of the inspections as low as possible, and the wide availability
of stations across a city would also save costs for car owners in terms of distance
and time. Texas, New York, New Jersey, Nevada, and Georgia were among the states
implementing this decentralized format. The alternative centralized format, where a
single entity performs all the inspections was adopted by Arizona, Illinois, Wisconsin
and the District of Columbia, among others.
Unfortunately, the potential welfare gains expected from outsourcing the vehic-
ular emission inspections to private firms were not guaranteed, since some of the
necessary assumptions for perfect competition were not satisfied. First, the service
transacted is not an homogeneous good. Test results can be manipulated in many
different ways by the inspectors to obtain a false result, given that they cannot be
perfectly supervised. Moreover, the risk of losing customers to other competitors and
4with that, the future stream of income coming from those interactions, create a mis-
alignment of incentives between the inspectors and the state air quality regulators,
potentially leading to adverse outcomes. Stations seek to maximize profits, while the
regulator wants to reduce pollution. With costly and imperfect supervision, stations
can alter the results of the tests without being discovered if such practices are prof-
itable.
There are other markets where this misalignment of incentives between supervi-
sors and principal may occur. For instance, auditing firms act as supervisor for the
shareholders of a company that want to know the real situation of the firm where
their money is invested. However, audit firms offer other services directly to the firms,
creating a conflict of interest. Another example is the case of environmental impact
assessments, in which independent firms are hired to evaluate the possible effects
of mining projects. These firms act as supervisors for the government, whose moti-
vation is sustainable development of the mining projects. As many of these firms,
however, offer other services to the mining companies, there also exists a misaligment
of incentives.
This paper’s contribution is to identify the effect that market structure can have
over fraudulent behavior in the emission inspection market in a major I/M program.
I focus on a particular form of test manipulation that is arguably one of the most
common forms of vehicular emissions inspection fraud in the United States: clean
piping. Clean piping is the practice of using a clean car to obtain a passing result
for a car that would otherwise not pass emissions inspection. Specifically, I focus
on cases in which one car that has already passed the inspection is used a second
consecutive time for a new reading, this time the reading being assigned to a different
vehicle. This way, a nonpassing vehicle can obtain a passing result without any need to
perform repairs. This form of test manipulation has been documented by Oliva (2012)
5for the Mexico City I/M program to account for 14% of all passing vehicles. Other
studies have analyzed how per-station failure rates in the United States are affected
by the station internal and vertical organization, as shown by Hubbard (1998), for
the California program, or Pierce and Toffel (2012) for a northeastern state.
In this paper I develop a new methodology for detecting cheating in the form
of clean piping. This methodology generates data for a decision process on where to
focus supervision to improve the efficacy of I/M programs, especially in developing
countries. In this study, the test technology used for the inspections analyzed is based
on direct tailpipe measurements. This testing technology has been replaced in recent
years by a technology based on readings of the information stored in the vehicles’
on-board computers, installed in cars 1996 and newer. In time, inspections based on
tailpipe measurements will be used only a small fraction of the market inspection
in most developed countries. In developing countries, however, lower income levels
induce car makers to produce cars at the lowest possible cost, which, in many cases,
means producing cars without standard on-board computers. More importantly, cars
remain in service for many more years than in developed countries. Low labor costs
for repair and low income result in car owners keeping their cars many more years,
and often operating at less than optimal conditions. Many developing countries are
now using or are planning to use tailpipe emissions inspections to reduce the pol-
lution from the vehicular fleet. For instance, in Latin America, many cities have
implemented emissions inspection programs, including Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Rio
de Janeiro, Santiago, Buenos Aires, and Bogota; other locations are considering the
implementation of such programs.
The empirical strategy used in this paper to detect fraud compares how well
the gas readings obtained from each inspection fit to any of two possible distribu-
tions based on observable variables. For the first distribution, the gas readings are
6explained by the observable characteristics of the vehicle. For the second distribu-
tion, the gas readings from two consecutive inspections are assumed to come from
the same vehicle. Then, the difference between two consecutive readings is attributed
only to differences in inspection-specific variables, such as temperature or humidity.
The estimated prevalence of clean piping fraud was 9% for the sample analyzed. To
check that results are not a mechanical artifact arising from a natural correlation be-
tween samples from the same distribution, I performed falsification tests re-ordering
randomly the arrival of vehicles to the stations. Results of this analysis show that the
results are not an artifact of pure statistical correlation.
Based on the fit of gas readings with one or another distribution, I obtained
probabilities of incidences of clean piping for each inspection in my sample. Then I
performed ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of these probabilities on car and
station characteristics, including the number of competitors. I expect to observe fraud
only if stations in a vicinity are perceived as close substitutes. At the same time, I
expect an effect on incidents of fraud by station only if customers are not extremely
loyal to a particular station. If this were the case, stations will have no incentive to
change the results of the inspections in their customers’ favor, since a loyal customer
base would return to the station regardless of result.
The presence of one additional station in the local market can affect incidence
of fraud in either direction. With customers without loyalty to a particular station,
inspectors will have little incentive to help them pass, since return customers are
unlikely. In this case, the more local competitors that exist, the more uncertain will
be customer loyalty, and the number of competitors will have a negative effect on the
incidence of cheating per station. If inspection stations perceive a negative reaction to
a failing result in the test, then inspectors have an incentive to achieve passing scores
on emissions testing. Otherwise, with more local competitors, it would be easier for
7customers to switch to a different station.
There are two other effects that can be correlated with the number of stations.
First, it may be the case that the number of inspection stations is associated with
characteristics (such as propensity to fail an emissions test) of the vehicles owned
by local clientele. I control this effect by incorporating vehicle characteristics in the
estimation. Second, it is possible that the number of stations is associated with the
reputation of certain stations or certain inspectors to have an enabling relationship
with their customers. In this case, the parameter of the number of stations would
be identifying the location of these stations or inspectors (dense clusters or isolated)
rather than the effect of competition. I control this effect by using fixed effects per
inspector, so that the parameter of the number of competitors captures deviations
with respect to the mean probability per inspector. OLS estimation results show that
with one more competitor in a radius of 0.5 mile, the chances of clean piping fraud
increases by 0.7%. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of loyal customers
reacting negatively to past experiences.
This paper is organized into eight more sections. The next section reviews the
related literature. Section C describes the vehicular emission inspection program in
Atlanta. Section D presents the strategies used to detect clean piping in the sample.
Section E describes data used for the estimation. Section F presents the results of
the estimation, and performs falsification tests to check that results are not spurious.
Section G presents the results of the effect of competition on the probabilities of clean
piping, and section H concludes.
8B. Literature Review
Asymmetries of information have been studied in the economic literature mostly
within the principal–agent framework. Typically, the agent has an informational ad-
vantage or has the ability to perform activities that the principal cannot verify without
a considerable cost. To encourage agents to reveal their private information, the prin-
cipal offers contracts where the more productive agent receives a premium compared
to the first-best solution.1 Several studies have found empirical evidence that princi-
pals cannot always insure themselves against agents taking advantage of their private
information. For instance, Afendulis and Kessler (2007) found that for patients with
coronary artery disease, the chances of receiving a surgical treatment are higher when
the diagnosing cardiologist also performs surgical operations, compared with the car-
diologist that performs only drug treatments. Another example is the case of real
estate agents studied in Levitt and Syverson (2008). They found that despite having
contracts rewarding effort as measured by a commission on the price paid for the
houses for sale, when the house for sale is owned by the agents, houses stay longer
on the market and sell for higher prices than when the house is owned by a third
party. Jacob and Levitt (2003) analyzed teacher cheating behavior using data from
standarized test scores in Chicago. They developed an algorithm that detects unusual
patterns in the answers, and obtained evidence of cheating in around 4% – 5% of the
classrooms. More importantly, they found that the probabilities of cheating behavior
increase when schools are in danger of being closed, or when students are required to
pass the standard examination to progress to the next grade. These studies highlight
the fact that agents may have different incentives than their principals, and the final
1See Holmstrom (1979), Tirole (1988), Baron-Myerson (1982), Markin-Riley
(1984), Laffont-Tirole(1986) for a more formal treatment of this relationship.
9outcome can be inefficient from the point of view of the principal.
The vehicle emission inspection market differs from a conventional principal–
agent framework in that there is an intermediary in the relationship between car
owners and regulator. It can be better described as a three-level hierarchy: principal–
supervisor–agent. The salient feature of this setting is that collusion between super-
visors and agents against the principal is possible.2 Principals try to discourage this
behavior by offering contracts with premiums to the supervisor. In two seminal pa-
pers studying this setting, Tirole (1986, 1992) offers a stylized model of a three-level
firm where the owner (principal) has to hire a supervisor to collect information about
a productive agent. The supervisor can conceal what he learns and can engage in a
collusive side-contract with the agent when doing so favors his own interests.3 Most
theoretical studies have focused on transactions occurring inside a single firm.
Several empirical studies have analyzed the emission inspection markets, focusing
on the station-car owner relationship. Oliva (2012) studies the emission inspection
market in Mexico City. Using a structural model of car owner retesting and cheating
decisions, she found that at least 14% of owners of older vehicles paid bribes of
$20 to circumvent test failure. Hubbard (1998), using a sample of inspections from
2As mentioned in Tirole (1986), other cases of three-level hierarchies are restau-
rant owner/maitre d’/waiter or voter/government agency/defense contractor (or reg-
ulated firm), brass/colonel/regiment, economic profession/Ph.D. advisor/Ph.D. stu-
dent, investor/broker/firm, Department of Defense/contractor/subcontractor, train
company/ticket inspector/passenger.
3Other related paper are Kofman and Lawarree (1993), who develop a model with
internal and external supervisors, and show that the optimal contract may specify
random external audits; Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (1999, 2002), who
show that the cost of collusion between supervisor and agent depends upon the col-
lusion stake, the accuracy of the supervisor technology and the supervisor’s degree
of risk aversion; and Khalil and Lawarree (2006), who show that the supervisor can
be totally useless if the supervisor’s independence can be compromised with relative
ease and derive a demand for independent external supervisors, for whom the cost of
collusion is given by the risk of future detection.
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California. tested whether passing results are affected by the organization of the
firm, and found results consistent with agency theory. In particular, he found less
incidence of collusion between stations when the station is a chain shop (e.g. Sears,
Pep Boys) than an independent firm. In chain shops, usually the manager receives a
salary that it is not attached to the number of customers, reducing the incentive to
promote repeated business. In independent garages, the manager is often the owner
of the station, so any gains from returning customers will benefit him directly. He also
found that the probabilities of failing tests increases with the number of inspectors
in the station. When inspectors are paid by the number of customers they service, in
stations with several inspectors, the chances of one single customer coming back to
the same inspector are small, even considering other types of services the stations can
provide. Consequently, as the number of inspectors increases, the incentives to induce
a customer to return by offering a high-quality service are smaller compared with the
case of a station with a single inspector. In a related work, Hubbard (2002) found that
consumers are 30 percent more likely to return to a station at which they previously
passed compared to one at which they failed. This result is consistent with customers
incomplete information about a station’s trustiness, and with weak priors about a
station’s type. At the same time, however, Hubbard finds that demand is sensitive to a
firm’s overall failure rate, which indicates that customers are actually not completely
uninformed about a station’s type either. Otherwise, after controlling for station-
observable characteristics (from the point of view of the car owner), there should be no
relationship between the failure rate and the choice of station. This finding constitutes
evidence that the information from inspection outcomes diffuses significantly across
consumers in the market. Customers create an incentive to the station to be friendly to
encourage repeat business. Pierce and Toffel (2012) analyzed the emission inspection
market in a northeastern state and tested if monitoring leniency is associated with
11
the internal organization of the firm. They found that opportunities of selling other
products or services to the cars inspected, especially for stations that can sell high-
margin products (e.g., parts) and services (e.g., repairs), increases leniency. They
also found more leniency from independent stations than from branded or subsidiary
facilities, which is consistent with the hypotheses that certain governance structures
inside the firm increase the cost of failing to enforce regulations.
C. Emission Inspections in Atlanta
The inspection and maintenance Program in Atlanta started in 1995. By 2002, most
cars registered in the metropolitan area were required to pass an annual emission
inspection.4 This mandate included gasoline-powered passenger cars and light-duty
trucks up to 8,500 pounds. Vehicles up to two years old and older than 25 years are
exempted from this obligation. If a car fails an inspection, and after having performed
corrective repairs equivalent to a certain amount5, fails a re-inspection, the owner can
apply for a waiver and obtain a sticker for that year. Any business in the area can
apply for and, after some mandatory training, obtain a license to perform inspec-
tions. The state agency charged with running the program is the Georgia’s Clean Air
Force (GCAF), which has granted licenses to repair stations, gas stations, car wash
businesses, and some firms dedicated exclusively to emission inspections. By the end
of 2003, there were more than 700 testing stations in the Atlanta metropolitan area
performing the type of inspections analyzed in this paper. The price stations charge
for the inspections is regulated by the GCAF. For the period covered in the data
available (2002–2003), the price cap was $25 per inspection, and the vast majority
4Counties of Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette,
Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, Paulding, and Rockdale.
5Equivalent to $787 in 2009.
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of stations charged this price. This fee allows for one free re-inspection at the same
station. If a car fails the inspection and is taken to a different station, the inspector
is not required to waive the fee. The average failure rate for the sample period is 13.5
The inspection method applied to a vehicle varies with the age of the vehicle.
For this paper, I will use only the data from the acceleration simulated mode (ASM)
test. This test methodology is used for cars with make year 1995 or older. This test is
based on direct readings of gases from the tailpipe of the vehicles. In the sample period
considered in my data, about half the fleet of vehicles in Atlanta were inspected using
this method. For cars 1996 or newer, the test performed is the on-board diagnosis
(OBD), based on readings of the information stored on the on-board computer. For
cars that cannot be inspected with either of the previous methodologies, the two-
speed idle (TSI) test is applied. Table 1 presents the number of cars inspected in the
period analyzed and the results of the inspection by type of test. As can be noticed,
cars inspected under ASM tend to fail more often, since they are older vehicles.
The mechanics of the ASM test work as follows. The inspector scans or types the
vehicle identification number (VIN) of the vehicle into the gas analyzer (a computer
with gas sensors to perform the inspection). This computer downloads the vehicle’s
information from a centralized database. The inspector places a probe inside the
tailpipe. To obtain a realistic and representative sample of the vehicle’s emissions,
the car is parked over a treadmill-like dynamometer. To pass the test, the 10-second
moving average readings for the three regulated gases (hydrocarbons, nitric oxide,
and carbon monoxide) must be below the applicable test standard, which varies by
vehicle, vehicle year and weight. The test takes 90 seconds, though a 15 second “warm-
up period” is excluded from the result. Complementing the gas test is a visual check
of the catalytic converter and the gas cap.
There are many ways in which a station can help their customers pass. Hubbard
13
Table 1—Inspections by Type of Test
Test Result
Test Type Pass Failure Abort Total
ASM Inspections 1,523,655 328,436 1,924 1,854,015
Percentage 82.3 17.7 0.1 100.0
OBD 1,666,376 173,591 102 1,840,069
90.6 9.4 0.0 100.0
TSI 58,925 3,818 128 62,871
93.9 6.1 0.2 100.0
Total 3,248,956 505,845 2,154 3,756,955
86.5 13.5 0.1 100.0
Notes: Reported statistics referred to all the inspections performed
between May 2002 and December 2003 in the 13 counties of the Atlanta
Metropolitan Area under the I/M program. ASM stands for Acceleration
Simulated Mode, OBD stands for On-Board Diagnosis, and TSI stands
for Two-Speed Idle.
(1998) describes legal options such as warming-up the vehicle before the inspection,
or being more lenient in the visual inspection. Pierce and Toffel (2012) describe other
methods to manipulate the test, like introducing fuel additives (e.g., denatured al-
cohol), adjusting the tailpipe probe, diverting exhaust before it reaches the tailpipe,
or inducing the car to run at fewer revolutions per minute. To the extent that the
complementary information about the inspection, like oxygen reading, or revolutions
per minute are recorded, I believe that those forms of test manipulation are not preva-
lent. Oliva (2012) documents in detail a form of test manipulation employed in the
14
Mexico City emission inspection program. This consists of using a clean car to obtain
a passing reading for the next car in the line. The great advantage of this form of
test manipulation is that once the second gas reading was obtained and the passing
result recorded, it is very difficult to verify ex post that the actual car was inspected.
In the United States, states with emission inspection programs are aware of the
higher failure rates in centralized programs compared with their decentralized coun-
terparts. State regulators and the Environmental Protection Agency try to discourage
test manipulation by applying severe sanctions to violators. These types of illegal ac-
tivities persist, however, as reported in the media.6 As can be noticed on the news
reported, and according to conversations with state officials, the most common type
of manipulation is clean piping (or clean scanning for newer cars). However, most of
these cases are detected not by routine audits but by unusual patterns in the reported
data or by anonymous tips. Most states make undercover visits to the stations, but
they are expensive and performed on a limited scale. Chances of detecting misbehavior
this way are limited.7
D. Methodology
To detect clean piping I developed a methodology based on a switching regression
model that assigns probabilities to each inspection of being a clean piping case. Before
proceeding with this estimation, I applied the reduced-form methodology developed
6See news reports from Nevada (http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-
enrd-015.html), California (http://business-video.tmcnet.com/news/2007/01/15/
2245227.htm, http://www.almanacnews.com/news/show story.php?id=6626),
Georgia (http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2011/02/28/3-locals-indicted-
on-emissions-fraud.html).
7In Georgia, during the year 2003, 2,139 undercover visits were performed for more
than 1 million inspections performed across 683 stations. In 766 of these visits, the
cars were emitting pollutants over the permitted limit. Only in 10 (1.3%) of these 766
visits obtained a passing result, leading to an investigation to the station.
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by Oliva (2012) to detect the existence of clean piping cases in the sample, and explain
the obstacles obtaining an unbiased mean incidence estimator. The details of both
methodologies are explained next.
1. Linear Estimations
When a clean car is used to obtain a passing result for the next car in line, two con-
secutive readings will be very similar, after controlling for differences in the inspection
conditions like temperature or humidity. Following this intuition, Oliva (2012) sug-
gests the use of linear regressions for testing for the existence of manipulation, using
as dependent variables the gas readings, and as explanatory variables, the reading of
the preceding car and observable characteristics of the car supposedly tested. If the
recorded emissions from the car tested inmmediately before has explanatory power,
then we can claim that there is evidence of clean piping.
More formally, for the general case of an honest inspection, the gas readings can
be modeled according to the following linear specification:
rhi = Xiβ + Ziγ + e
h
i (2.1)
where index i corresponds to the car inspected. rhi is the true gas reading that would
be obtained if the car were inspected, Xi is car characteristics that determine the gas
readings (e.g., odometer, displacement, body type). Zi include two type of variables
that are specific to the inspection: environmental factors that can affect the reading
(e.g., temperature, humidity) and car characteristics that determine the resistance of
the dynamometer when the car is tested (e.g., displacement, weight). The variables
contained in Zi are a subset of the ones in Xi, so the γ parameters for this subset
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of variables will not be separately identifiable from β. ehi is the error term associated
which each honest inspection. The error term ehi is assumed to be i.i.d., which means
that the linear specification is appropiate to capture the relationship between X, Z,
and rh. At the same time, we assume that there is no serial correlation that cannot be
captured by the observable characteristics, nor by fixed effects per analyzer/month.
This implies that the variables observed by the econometrician are good enough to
characterize the readings.
When the inspection is a clean piping case, the reading comes from the following
specification:
rci = X i−1β + Ziγ + e
c
i (2.2)
which means that the reading is generated by the observable characteristics of the
car ahead in line, inspection-specific variables, and an error term. The superindex c
in the error term is used to distinguish this error term from the generated when is an
honest case. rci can also be expressed in terms of the gas reading of the car ahead in
line. In this case, we would have that:
rci = X i−1β + Ziγ + e
c
i +
(
rhi−1 −X i−1β − Zi−1γ − ehi
)
= rhi−1 + (Zi − Zi−1) γ +
(
eci − ehi−1
)
(2.3)
Given these specification for rhi and r
c
i , each observed gas reading can be char-
acterized as:
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ri = mi [r
c
i ] + (1−mi)
[
rhi
]
(2.4)
where mi is an index variable equal to one for the clean piping cases. After replacing
both rci and r
h
i by their observed components, we obtain:
ri = mi
[
rhi−1 + (Zi − Zi−1) γ + eci − ehi−1
]
+ (1−mi)
[
Xiβ + Ziγ + e
h
i
]
(2.5)
I prefer replacing rci with the specification based on the reading of the car ahead
in line, instead of just plugging the observables of the car ahead in line, because the
actual reading contains more information (i.e., the error term) than the specification
based on observables. Also, the error term is smaller since the error term included
(eci − ehi−1) is only the difference between readings coming from the same car. Finally,
using rhi−1 allows to obtain an intuitive direct parameter that can be used for testing
for the existence of clean piping cases in the sample.
Based on (2.5), we can estimate the following linear specification:
ri = ϕ˜ri−1 + (Zi − Zi) γ˜ +Xiβ˜ + Ziγˆ + ui (2.6)
where
ui = mi
[
eci − ehi−1
]
+ (1−mi)
[
ehi
]
(2.7)
This specification collapses to the following specification when all mi are equal to
zero:
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ri = Xiβ + Ziγ + e
h
i (2.8)
Hence, to test whether all the mi in the sample are equal to zero, we can estimate
(2.6) by OLS and analyze the individual significance test of ϕ˜. Alternatively, we could
also evaluate the test for individual significance of γ˜, or on a test of joint significance
for ϕ˜ and γ˜, under the assumption that γ 6= 0. I will prefer to test directly for the
significance of ϕ˜ rather to the other two tests because these other tests rest on the
additional assumption of the differences in environmental variables having an effect
on the readings (γ 6= 0), while the individual significance of ϕ˜ depends entirely on
the existence of clean piping cases in the sample.
In case some of the observations in the sample are clean piping cases, then ϕ˜ will
be different from zero. If this is the case, using matrix notation we can express the
OLS estimator for ϕ˜ in (2.6) as:
ϕˆOLSm = (r
′
−1(I − PV )r−1)−1r′−1(I − PV )r (2.9)
where r−1is the vector of readings of the car ahead in line, PV is the projection matrix
of the matrix V that contains all the other right-hand side variables in (2.6), and r
is the vector of readings of the car inspected. Formally I will define the test for the
existence of clean piping cases as8:
H0 : plim(ϕ˜) = 0 if ∀mi = 0 (2.10)
8The asymptotic properties of this test can be found in Appendix A.
19
H1 : plim(ϕ˜) 6= 0 if ∃mi 6= 0 (2.11)
The results of the estimation of (2.6) under different linear specifications are
presented in Table 2. The table reports only the parameter ϕ˜. For all the specifica-
tions considered the parameter ϕ˜ is statistically different from zero, rejecting the null
hypothesis of no clean piping cases. Hence, I conclude that there is evidence that at
least a sub sample of the observations are cases of clean piping, where two consecutive
readings come from the same vehicle.
2. Mean Incidence Estimation Limitations
A natural extension of the methodology developed in the preceding section would be
its use to estimate the mean incidence of clean piping. We can estimate (2.6), and
ideally, we would like ϕ˜ to be equal to an estimator of the incidence of clean piping:
mˆ0 =
N∑
i
mi
N
(2.12)
Imposing temporarily the additional assumption in (2.9) that r−1 is orthogonal to all
the variables contained in V , we obtain the following expression for ϕˆOLSm :
ϕˆOLSm = (r
′
−1r−1)
−1r′−1r (2.13)
After replacing r by its observable components, as defined in (2.5), we obtain an
explicit form for ϕˆOLSm :
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Table 2—Gas Readings SUR Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hydrocarbon 0.0177 0.0102 0.0086 0.0091
(z-test) 65.53 39.60 34.19 35.99
Carbon monoxide 0.0056 0.0028 0.0029 0.0031
23.61 12.19 13.03 13.77
Nitric oxide 0.0240 0.0107 0.0112 0.0118
33.71 15.30 16.37 17.12
Carbon dioxide 0.3109 0.1605 0.0466 0.0475
329.70 183.25 85.62 72.25
Fixed effects by station/month X X X
Vehicle and inspection controls X X
Differences between
X
consecutive inspections
Chi2 test joint significance 110,000.00 34,827.28 8,678.16 6,697.59
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 675,522 675,119 675,119 675,119
Notes: Table reports the parameter ϕ˜ from (2.6) from four SUR especifications.
ϕ˜ is the effect of the gas reading of the preceding car over the gas reading of the
next car in line. Vehicle and inspection controles are vehicle age, engine size (cc),
odometer reading, weight, transmission type, temperature, humidity and dilution
factors, previous repairs performed (dummy), and trial number. Differences between
consecutive inspections are differences in temperature, humidity and dilution factors.
All the continuos variables were included as polynomial of third degree.
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ϕˆOLSm =
N∑
i=1
mir
2
i−1
N∑
i=1
r2i−1
+
N∑
i=1
{
ri−1mi
[
(Zi − Zi−1) γ + eci − ehi−1
]
+ ri−1 (1−mi)
[
Xiβ + Ziγ + e
h
i
]}
N∑
i=1
r2i−1
(2.14)
=
N∑
i=1,mi=1
r2i−1
N∑
i=1
r2i−1
+
N∑
i=1,mi=1
ri−1
[
(Zi − Zi−1) γ + eci − ehi−1
]
N∑
i=1
r2i−1
+
N∑
i=1,mi=0
ri−1
[
rhi
]
N∑
i=1
r2i−1
(2.15)
The first term of the right hand side can work as an estimator for the mean inci-
dence, given that the ri−1 terms included in the numerator have the same magnitude,
on average, than the ri−1 not included. Actually, since the readings included in the
numerator will most likely be readings well under the permitted maximum, the esti-
mator will be biased downward. However, there is an important source of bias in the
second term. In that term, ehi−1 is present by itself and as part of ri−1. Then, even
if ri−1 is orthogonal to the difference in inspection specific variables (Zi − Zi−1) and
the error term of the clean piping reading (eci), the correlation between ri−1 and e
h
i−1
for the clean piping cases will not be different from zero. Hence, that term will not
cancel out. The third term will vanish since for the honest cases we can assume that
the consecutive readings are not correlated. Lifting the assumption of orthogonality
between r−1 and V will add more complexity to the expression, making more difficult
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its interpretation.9
3. Switching Regression Model
To avoid this problem and obtain an unbiased estimator for the mean incidence
I propose a switching regression model estimated using the E-M algorithm. This
methodology has the advantage of obtaining unbiased estimates, under distributional
assumptions of the error terms, and assigning a probability of clean piping to each
inspection.
To understand the methodology, let’s start by considering the case of one par-
ticular station in one given month in the sample. We define, for each inspection in
the station/month, the probability of clean piping, mi, as coming from a Bernoulli
distribution, with probabilities λj of mi being equal to one and (1− λj) of mi being
equal to zero. This parameter is different for each station, and within a single station
it will take different values for each month of the year. For simplicity, consider the
case of one particular gas.10 Define the probability of observing jointly ui from (2.7)
and mi as coming from a mixture of normal distributions as follows:
f (ui,mi|ri−1, V, θ) = fm (ui|mi, ri−1, V, θ) f (mi|ri−1, V, θ)
= fm (ui|mi = 1, ri−1, V, θ)λj+
fm (ui|mi = 0, ri−1, V, θ) (1− λj) (2.16)
According to (2.2) and (2.3), ui will come from different linear specifications depend-
9A more detailed discussion of the existence of bias can be found in the Appendix
B.
10For the rest of the section, I use only one gas as dependent variable. In the actual
estimation, I use the 4 gases recorded, allowing the error terms to be correlated.
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ing on the value of mi.Then, under the assumption of the error terms of both (2.2)
and (2.3) being normal i.i.d. with mean zero and constant variance, we can express
the probability of realization of each observation as:
f (ui,mi|ri−1, V, θ) = 1√
2piσ21
exp
[
− 1
2σ21
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ)2
]
(λj)
+
1√
2piσ22
exp
[
− 1
2σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)2
]
(1− λj)
(2.17)
From here we can derive the following log-likelihood function:
L =
J∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
− 1
2
ln (2N) +
J∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
ln{λj
σ1
exp
(
− 1
2σ21
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ)2
)
+
1− λj
σ2
exp
(
− 1
2σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)2
)
} (2.18)
By maximizing directly (2.18) we can obtain the parameters λj, γ , β ,σ1, and
σ2. The explicit solution for expression for the estimator of the mean incidence of
clean piping per station/month (λj) can be explicitly obtained from the FOC with
respect to λj. After some manipulation, the FOC can be expressed as
∂L
∂λj
=
Nj∑
i=1
1
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
λ
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1−λ
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
) = 0 (2.19)
where µ1i and µ
2
i are respectively (εi − ei−1) and ei from (2.7). φ (.) is the normal
standard density function. Then, (2.19) implies:
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Nj∑
i=1
1
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
) = Nj∑
i=1
1
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
) (2.20)
To gain some intuition about the interpretration of (2.20), consider the case where
for a subset of observations (Nj1) the probability of being a clean piping case is
positive ( 1
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
> 0) and the probability of being an honest case is very small
( 1
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
→ 0). For the other observations (Nj2), consider the opposite situation,
the probabilities of being clean piping are very remote ( 1
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
→ 0), and the
probabilities of being honest are at least positive ( 1
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
> 0). To have this case,
we would need each observation to be clearly assigned to only one of the possible
cases. Then (2.20) will collapse to
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj1
1
λj
=
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj2
1
1− λj
Nj1
λj
=
Nj2
1− λj
λj =
Nj1
Nj1 +Nj2
(2.21)
Then, the incidence parameter will represent the share of observations that are
clean piping within the station/month. In case the specifications assign the same
probabilities to each observation, then (2.20) will collapse to the equality Nj = Nj,
which implies that any value for λj will satisfy the FOC, and the parameter will not
be identifiable.
To obtain consistent parameters from the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE),
the FOC coming from the log-likelihood function need to hold. These FOC are re-
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quired as regularity conditions in order to apply the usual properties of MLE esti-
mators, including consistency and asymptotic normality. These necessary conditions
are that the error terms from the second specification (honest cases) have be orthog-
onal to Xi, and the error terms from each specification have to be orthogonal to the
variables (Zt −Zt−1) for the manipulation cases, and to Xi for the honest cases. The
necessary assumptions for these conditions to hold are presented in Appendix C.
4. E-M Algorithm
The empirical estimation by maximum likelihood of (2.18) would require the estima-
tion of one individual incidence parameter per station/month, which would make the
estimation intractable given the high number of parameters. To avoid this problem, I
use the E-M algorithm, in a similar way as used in Porter (1983). As shown in Kiefer
(1980), the solutions to this algorithm maximize also the likelihood equation. The
sequence of the algorithm is as follows.
First, I obtain initial values m0i . Kiefer (1980) does not indicates any particular
form to obtain initial values, so I decided on a strategy that initially identifies as clean
piping cases those for which the error term under the honest specification is quite
large. For this, I estimate linear regressions of the gas readings against observables,
as if all the cases were honest. Since I expect to have a small share of clean piping
cases, I expect the value of the parameters to be driven mostly by the honest cases
and, hence, to have a small bias. With these parameters, I obtain initial error terms for
both specifications (clean piping and honest). These error terms are then transformed
into normal standard distributions, and the probability density function for each
standardized error term is obtained. Then, I compare values coming from similar
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distribution functions11. More formally, m0i is obtained as:
m0i =
1√
2pi
exp
[
−1
2
(
ξˆOLSi
)2]
1√
2pi
exp
[
−1
2
(
ξˆOLSi
)2]
+ 1√
2pi
exp
[
−1
2
(ˆOLSi )
2
] (2.22)
where ξˆOLSi and ˆ
OLS
i are the standardized error terms coming from the clean piping
and honest specifications. In the next step, I estimate the other parameters of the
log-likelihood function, substituting λj for m
0
i , and obtaining θ̂
0 =
(
γ̂0, β̂0, σ̂21
0
, σ̂22
0)
:
L
(
θ̂
)
=
J∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
ln{m
0
i
σ̂1
0 exp
(
− 1
2σ̂21
0
(
ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ̂0
)2)
(2.23)
+
1−m0i
σ̂2
0 exp
(
− 1
2σ̂22
0
(
ri −Xiβ̂0 − Ziγ̂0
)2)
} (2.24)
with θ̂0, I update m0i applying Bayes’ rule and replacing λj by an initial estimator λ
0
j
based on the initial values for m0i as follows:
λ0j =
Nj∑
i=1
m0i
Nj
(2.25)
Hence, the updated value m1i is obtained as:
m1i =
λ0j
[
1
σ̂01
φ
(
ri−ri−1−(Zi−Zi−1)γ̂0
σ̂01
)]
λ0j
[
1
σ̂01
φ
(
ri−ri−1−(Zi−Zi−1)γ̂0
σ̂01
)]
+
(
1− λ0j
) [
1
σ̂02
φ
(
ri−Xiβ̂0−Zγ̂0
σ̂02
)] (2.26)
11They will not be exactly equal since the error terms for the 4 gases present are
correlated.
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with these new values m1t I estimate λ
1
jas the average of m
1
t per station/month, and
maximize again the log-likelihood function, obtaining θ̂1. This procedure is repeated
until the correlation between the series mki and m
k+1
i is higher than 0.99.
5. Identification
The identification of the switching regression model arises from how well the readings
of the four gases fit simultaneously the linear specifications, compared with how well
they fit the clean piping specification. A drawback is that inspections with large error
terms under the honest specification can be identified as clean piping cases, if the
clean piping specification has a smaller error term, even when they are not. In these
cases, the clean piping specification does not fit well, just not as badly as the honest
specification. This can lead to identify as clean piping cases that are actually honest
readings.
At the same time, in stations/month with lower incidence (λj), the clean piping
specification has to fit much better than the honest specification for a case to be
detected as clean piping. This is because in the predicted probability as defined in
(2.26), the parameter of the incidence (λj) weighs the value of the density function
under clean piping, so that the error term has to be very close to zero for the density
function be high and the predicted probability high, as well. This may cause some
cases not to be detected if the incidence is low for the station/month. In an analogous
manner, station/months with high incidence may end up mis-classify some inspections
in stations/months with high λj.
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6. Linear Regressions on Predicted Probabilities
From the switching regressions we obtain the probabilities for each inspection to
belong to one specific type, honest or manipulated. To determine how this incidence
is associated with the characteristics of the station and the local market where it is
located, I perform OLS regressions of these probabilities against the characteristics
of the vehicle inspected, characteristics of the market where the station is located
and fixed effects by inspector. I prefer to use disaggregated data rather than station-
level aggregations to take the maximum advantage of the information available. The
specification to be estimated is then:
m̂i = ΘCompetitorsj +Wiτ + Inspectorkψ + ζi (2.27)
where m̂i is the predicted probability, Competitorsj is the number of competitors
within 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0 and 5 miles. Wi represents the control variables used,
which vary station and by vehicle inspected. Inspectork are inspectors fixed effects,
and ζi is the error term.
E. Data
Data available correspond to all ASM inspections performed in Atlanta from April
2002 to December 2003. The information was provided by Georgia Clean Air Force,
and contains the recorded gas readings and vehicle characteristics, such as make,
model, and odometer reading. The data provided also contains information about
the address of the station where the inspection was performed, and the inspector
identification. The address information was used to estimate the number of local
competitors, defined as the number of other stations performing also ASM inspections
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in the same month within a defined radius of the station.
For the estimation, I used data on the four gases recorded during the inspec-
tion. Many stations perform more than one type of inspection, and the sequence of
recorded readings can contain different types of inspections. I consider in the sam-
ple only cases where two or more ASM tests were performed consecutively, and the
second one obtained a passing result. In addition, I normalized the variables subtract-
ing the mean and dividing the difference by the standard deviation of the variables.
Additionally, to avoid estimating a high number of parameters in the switching re-
gression model, I demeaned the variables by station/analyzer/month. Finally, I did
not consider the first inspection per day in every station/analyzer, since the previous
recorded inspection in the data corresponds to the last inspection performed the day
before.
From the 2000 Census, I obtained the number of vehicles and median household
income per census tract, which I used as controls for demand potential for every
station. The number of competitors was obtained using the address of the stations.
Tables 3 and 4 present the summary statistics for the variables available at the in-
spection level and at the station/month and market level.
F. Estimation Results
1. Switching Regression Results
The results from the estimation of the switching regression model show that the av-
erage probability of being a clean piping case is 8.8%, for the sample used in the
estimation12. Moreover, when analyzing the distribution of the estimated probabili-
ties, we observe that they are very close either to one or zero. (see Figure 1) This
12The parameters obtained from the estimation can be found at Appendix D.
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Table 3—Variables Available by Inspection
Variable Type Name Mean Std. Dev.
Gas Readings Hydrocarbons (ppm) 59.07 45.6
Carbon monoxide (%) 0.20 0.3
Nitric oxide (ppm) 444.75 388.8
Carbon dioxide (%) 14.50 1.3
Car characteristics Weight (lb) 3,480.50 598.0
Displacement (cc) 3,171.19 1,218.9
Manual transmission 0.20 –
Odometer reading 127,705.70 64,119.0
Vehicle age 11.17 3.5
Repairs performed 0.11 –
Inspection characteristics Temperature 79.99 14.2
Humidity factor 0.96 0.1
Dilution factor 1.08 0.1
First trial 0.89 –
Second trial 0.09 –
Third or later trial 0.02 –
Observations 675,119
Notes: Gas readings correspond to the 25/25 section of the test. Standard deviation
omitted for discrete variables that represent shares of the sample.
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Table 4—Variables Available at Station and Market Level
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Active stations by month 496.1 12.4
Inspectors by station/month 3.6 1.9
Inspections by station/month 68.0 86.0
Competitors by market 0.10 miles 0.14 0.37
0.25 miles 0.44 0.74
0.50 miles 0.97 1.16
1.0 miles 2.12 1.90
2.0 miles 5.98 4.19
5 miles 25.93 16.06
Inspections by market 0.10 miles 211.38 202.08
0.25 miles 258.61 233.22
0.50 miles 348.72 302.24
1.0 miles 526.27 392.70
2.0 miles 1,133.97 665.71
5 miles 4,444.48 2,646.50
Census Tract Information Number of vehicles 4,902.4 2,680.1
Median household income 52,095.6 17,650.3
Notes: Information at the station/month level represents the average across stations and
months. There are 9,922 combinations of station and month with at least one inspection
performed. Information by market represent the average across markets and months.
Markets are defined by a circle with the indicated raduis centered at each station. Census
tract information obtained from the 2000 Census.
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means that the model assign each inspection to one particular type (clean piping or
honest) very clearly. The average incidence by station/month have a decent amount
of variation, having a standard deviation of 0.144 and with few cases going over 20%
of incidence. The incidence by station/month falls on average when there are more
competitors in a circle of 1/2 mile, which is a preliminary indication that that more
competition leads to less cheating. The average incidence falls only marginally when
the size of the station increase, as can be seen on the results by quartile of the station
by number of inspection performed per month. All these results are summarized in
the Table 5.
To check the characteristics of the vehicles of the inspections identified as clean
piping and honest, I compared means of both groups by the most important observable
characteristics. The results are shown in Table 6. As can be seen, clean piping cases
are older, slightly heavier, have bigger engine size and a slight bigger share of manual
transmission. Surprisingly, they have slightly lower odometer reading. Except by this
last result, all the other characteristics fits what intuitively can be expected for cars
with manipulated results compared to honestly inspected cars.
2. Falsification Tests
To check whether the results are actually coming from the data and are not purely
statistically driven, I re estimate the SUR regressions presented in the Table 2, but
re assorting randomly the arrival order to the station within month. The results are
shown in Table 7. They show that all parameters, with the exception of two, are non
significant at standard levels of statistical significance. Moreover, for all cases, the
value of the parameters is much smaller than the values obtained in Table 2. For the
only two significant parameters, the estimated values are negative and very close to
zero, which is very different to the parameters obtained with the actual arrival order.
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Table 5—Predicted Probabilities of Clean Piping by Inspection
Mean
All sample 0.088
Number of competitors (0.5 miles) 0 0.103
1 0.074
2 0.088
3 0.065
4 0.065
5 0.044
Station size (quartiles based on inspections) Smallest 0.109
2 0.110
3 0.081
Biggest 0.088
Average incidence of clean piping by station/month 0.089
Std. Dev. 0.144
Notes: Results obtained using a 10% random sample of inspections to reduce
estimation time. Quartiles were obtained independently for each month, con-
sidering the number of test performed by each station. One station can be in
different quartiles in different months. Incidence represents the average of the
percentage of inspections that obtained a predicted probability higher than 0.50
by station/month.
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Figure 1. Histograms of Predicted Probabilities by Inspection and Estimated Inci-
dence of Clean Piping by Station/Month
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Table 6—Vehicle Characteristics by Predicted Status
Honest Clean Piping All Sample
Age (years) 11.0 13.7 11.2
Weight (lb.) 3,474.0 3,571.9 3,482.6
Displacement (cc) 3,143.2 3,668.1 3,189.6
Odometer (miles) 127,839.1 121,585.0 127,286.1
Manual transmission (share) 0.20 0.23 0.20
However, the joint significance test for the four parameters cannot be rejected at 5%
of significance level for two of the models presented. Most of these results support
the claim that the results presented in Table 2 are not coming from purely statistical
association between consecutive readings. Otherwise, the estimated parameters would
be very similar, and as we have seen, they differ drastically from the ones previously
presented.
Regarding the results from the switching regression model, I obtained the mean
probability of being clean piping by the trial number per inspection cycle. As can be
seen in Table 8, the average probability increases from 8.2% to 14% when passing
from the first trial to the second one, which is an expected result since the pressure
to obtain a passing result for a customer would be higher in each retrial than in the
first one. The average probability increases up to 14.8% for the fourth or later trial.
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Table 7—Gas Readings SUR Estimates (Re-assorted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hydrocarbon 0.00821 0.00017 0.00036 0.00036
(z-test) 29.67 0.64 1.43 1.40
Carbon monoxide 0.00444 -0.00022 -0.00010 -0.00014
14.79 -0.93 -0.43 -0.61
Nitric oxide 0.01207 -0.00132 -0.00114 -0.00115
16.45 -1.84 -1.63 -1.62
Carbon dioxide 0.14479 -0.00187 -0.00079 -0.00183
140.16 -2.02 -1.42 -2.68
Fixed effects by station/month X X X
Vehicle and inspection controls X X
Differences between
X
inspections
Chi2 test joint significance 20453.5 9.1 7.3 12.4
p-value 0.000 0.059 0.122 0.015
Observations 625,895 625,403 625,403 625,403
Notes: Table reports the parameter ϕ˜ from (2.6) from four SUR especifications.
ϕ˜ is the effect of the gas reading of a car tested over the gas reading of an-
other car tested in the same station and month, selected randomly. Vehicle and
inspection controles are vehicle age, engine size (cc), odometer reading, weight,
transmission type, temperature, humidity and dilution factors, previous repairs
performed (dummy), and trial number. Differences between inspections are differ-
ences in temperature, humidity and dilution factors. All the continuos variables
were included as polynomial of third degree.
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Table 8—Incidence by Trial Number
Trial Number Mean Incidence Number of Inspections
1 0.082 58,764
2 0.140 5,988
3 0.122 1,388
4 or later 0.148 559
Total 0.088 66,699
3. Competition and Clean Piping Probabilities
The final step consisted of the regression of the predicted probabilities on the char-
acteristics by station, including the number of competitors. The parameters for the
number of competitors obtained from these regressions are reported in Table 9, where
each row considered a different size of local market by changing the size of the radius
from the station. The results show two different qualitative results for the leftmost
two columns, and the rightmost columns. In the first two columns, the probability
of being a clean piping case decreases with the number of local competitors, vary-
ing from -0.8% to -0.2% depending on the size of the local market selected. Only in
once case this effect is positive, and all cases are significant. However, in the last two
columns the effect of local competitors is positive, with the exception of the biggest
local market defined. This difference between these two set of results is explained by
the inclusion of fixed effects per inspector in the last two columns. If the test ma-
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nipulation depends more on a bad inspector performing the inspection rather than
on the market characteristics, then is the location of these bad inspectors that ex-
plains the effect of the number of competitors. In this case, the inclusion of fixed
effects by inspector will capture this relationship and the number of competitors will
turn not significant. If this is not the case, then including fixed effect by inspector
should not affect the results. As the results show, after including these fixed effects,
and after controlling by all the observable inspection, car and market characteristics
available, the effect of the number of competitors becomes positive and significant.
This means that regardless of being a good or bad inspector performing the inspec-
tion, the probabilities of being a clean piping case increases with the number of local
competitors. The effect of the number of competitors falls as we increase the size of
the radius from the station to define the local market, until becoming negative and
nonsignificant. This result is explained by the closest station driving the effect. As
more stations are added to the market, the effect is diluted among more stations,
so the parameters becomes smaller. According informal interviews performed to me-
chanics and inspectors, 0.5 miles is the distance considered by the industry as the
definition for local market.
G. Conclusion
Using data from the vehicular inspection program in Atlanta, I tested for the ex-
istence of inspection manipulation (false positives) in the program. I estimated the
incidence of the most common form of test fraud (clean piping) to be 9% of the passing
inspections during the sample period. Moreover, the incidence of clean piping – pass-
ing results of a different vehicle frauduently applied to a failing vehicle – per station
increased by 0.7% with one more competitor within a 0.5 mile radius, after control-
39
Table 9—OLS Regressions on Predicted Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.10 miles -0.00840∗∗ 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0391∗∗∗ 0.0350∗∗∗
-2.73 3.33 4.42 3.99
0.25 miles -0.00914∗∗∗ -0.00452∗∗ 0.00807 0.0130∗
-5.53 -2.80 1.58 2.53
0.50 miles -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.00889∗∗∗ 0.00100 0.00724∗
-12.41 -8.43 0.29 2.03
1.0 miles -0.00981∗∗∗ -0.00878∗∗∗ 0.00473∗ 0.00609∗∗
-15.00 -13.52 2.32 2.82
5 miles -0.00229∗∗∗ -0.00171∗∗∗ -0.00005 -0.00046
-31.47 -22.73 -0.12 -1.05
Vehicle, station, and
X X
census-tract controls
Inspector fixed effects X X
Observations 66,699 63,492 66,699 63,492
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Dependent variable is the predicted probability of being clean piping.
The parameter reported is Θ from (2.27), that represents the effect of one
additional competitor over the predicted probability of being clean piping. Car
characteristics include weight, displacement (cc), transmission type, odometer,
vehicle age, dual exhaust, repairs performed before the inspection, car body
type (sedan, station wagon, pickup, SUV, minivan, full-size van), dummies
for car make, and number of trials before obtaining a passing result. Stations
characteristics include the number of inspectors in the station. Census-tract
variables are the number of vehicles, and the median household income in the
census tract where the station is located.
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ling by car, station and inspector characteristics. These results show that increased
competition can lead to outcomes detrimental to society when there are asymmetries
of information and the incentives are not properly aligned for all the participants in
the market. These effects must also be considered when designing new markets, as it
was the case for the vehicular emission inspection market. Even when the question is
empirical as to whether these negative effects counterweigh the positive effects from
competition, such as lower prices, better quality and more convenience for the cus-
tomers, the potential for a suboptimal outcome should be considered, especially in
cases where supervision is costly or unrealiable, as in developing countries.
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CHAPTER III
DEMAND RESPONSE BY LARGE ELECTRICITY CUSTOMERS IN TEXAS
A. Introduction
In this chapter, we study the adoption and effect of time-varying prices using unique,
new data on commercial and industrial electricity customers in Texas. Policymak-
ers and academics have recognized the benefits of time-varying prices in electricity
markets for several decades, but the potential gains have been largely unrealized.
The social cost of generating electricity can more than double during the course of a
day, yet retail consumers generally pay the same flat rate regardless of whether the
wholesale costs are large or small.
Time-varying pricing (TVP), which in some forms is called real-time pricing,
can promote multiple goals of energy policy. First, TVP provides an efficient means
to curtail demand when electricity is scarce. In addition, TVP have the potential
to make total demand for electricity more elastic and thus reduce market power in
wholesale electricity markets. In the longer run, TVP could provide a low cost means
to address the intermittency problem of renewable generation. Renewable portfolio
standards and feed-in-tariffs are targeting ambitious quantities of electricity genera-
tion from renewable sources, and many of these renewable technologies such as wind
and solar provide power intermittently.1 As a result, electricity systems must either
procure potentially expensive quick start generation, or alternatively, can exploit the
quick stop capability of demand response induced by TVP.2 TVP has the potential
1As of May 2011, twenty-nine U.S. states and the District of Columbia have en-
acted renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policies. (Schmalensee, 2012)
2See Gowriskaran, Reynolds, and Samano (2011) for an analysis that quantifies
the costs of intermittency, and Joskow (2011) for a discussion of the relative costs
of intermittent and dispatchable generators. For a good summary of policies that
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to reduce the intermittency problem that is sometimes cited as an impediment to
increased penetration of renewable generation sources. Despite the potential for TVP
to make electricity systems more efficient, only a relatively small amount of TVP-
induced demand response exists for a variety of regulatory, consumer, and technolog-
ical reasons. In some settings, the barrier to time-varying prices was technological.
Some customers, particularly residential customers did not have meters that recorded
consumption over short time intervals. However, the increased installation of smart
meters and home area network technologies has reduced this hurdle. In other settings,
the barrier is that customers do not want to face prices that are not predictable, and
as a result, regulators have been reluctant to impose time-varying prices on various
classes of customers (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010).
This study uses new data on the use of time-varying prices in Texas to estimate
the amount of demand response capability. In Texas, commercial and industrial elec-
tricity customers contract bilaterally with retail electric providers. The terms of these
contracts are not regulated by a commission but rather arise from bilateral deals
between customers and retailers. We have assembled unique, customer-level data on
whether the terms of the contracts include time-varying prices. In addition, we have
customer-level data on the consumption during each 15-minute interval that can be
matched to real-time wholesale prices.
This study makes two novel contributions to the literature on time-varying prices.
First, we summarize the characteristics of commercial and industrial customers that
chose to voluntarily use time-varying prices. Much of the literature has estimated
the effect of randomly assigning customers to time-varying prices. 3 In future retail
promote renewable sources of electricity generation, see Schmalensee (2012).
3Although often the customers on TVP are random conditional on volunteering
for a pilot program.
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electricity markets, many customers are very likely to have the choice to choose their
pricing structure whether it be in regulated or deregulated retail markets. We have
data for nearly all big commercial and industrial customers in a market that has
allowed retail choice for some time. This is the first study of which we are aware that
studies the types of customers likely to choose TVP. Although external validity is still
uncertain, we believe that this paper provides insights into the types of customers
more likely to opt for TVP. It is important to understand the types of firms that are
likely to opt for time-varying prices as more states provide options for dynamic pricing
either via regulated tariffs or via deregulated retail markets. Second, we estimate
how much customers on time-varying prices reduce consumption in periods with high
prices. This information on demand response is an important input for understanding
the extent to which TVP can assist system operators in addressing intermittency
problems of renewable generation.
This study also contributes to a growing literature on the effect of time-varying
pricing and demand responsiveness in electricity markets. Recent years have seen an
increasing attention to investigating residential customers because the installation of
smart meters in some jurisdictions clears the infrastructure hurdle to charging time-
varying prices. Recent contributions to this literature include Allcott’s (2011) analysis
of real-time pricing in Chicago and Wolak’s (2010) analysis of Washington DC’s
critical peak and hourly pricing. The literature studying commercial and industrial
customers is more extensive because the metering infrastructure has been in place
for much longer, including Boisvert et al. (2007), Herriges et al. (1993), Taylor et al.
(2005) and Patrick and Wolak (2001).
We find a meaningful level of take-up of TVP – in some sectors more than
one-quarter of customers signed up for TVP. The empirical estimation of the own
price elasticities show values smaller than 0.01 in absolute value for most intervals
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during the day. Only for big firms and during peak time (4 p.m. to 6 p.m.) the own
price elasticity reaches -0.02. This implies a very small responsiveness of demand
in absolute value, accounting for a reduction of 9MWh by hour in response to an
increase of 10 cents in the price of electricity per kWH. This represents only 0.016%
of the aggregate consumption during an hour. An analysis by industry shows a similar
qualitative result.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents the
institutional setting of the electricity market in Texas. Section C presents the data
used for the empirical estimation. Section D describes the methodology used for the
elasticities estimation. Section E presents the results, from the data available and
from the empirical estimation. Section F concludes.
B. Electricity Procurement by Commercial and Industrial Customers in Texas
Texas is one of several U.S. states to allow retail competition in electricity. Retail
firms procure power from generation owners and sell to commercial, industrial, and
residential end-users. Since 2002, commercial and industrial (C&I) customers served
by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) have been able to purchase
power from a competitive retailer rather than the former vertically integrated utility.4
Individual C&I customers and electric retailers bilaterally negotiate power contracts.
The agreements can vary along a variety of dimensions including how risk is
shared and how much the customer is exposed to the wholesale spot price of power.
For example, a contract could simply specify a fixed rate for all consumption, a so-
called requirements contract. Other possible contracts could specify a price that varies
4Small parts of Texas are served by other reliability councils (Southeastern Electric
Reliability Council in the southeast, the Southwest Power Pool in the northeast and
northwest, and the Western Electricity Coordinating Countil in the far west), but the
vast majority of Texas consumers are served by ERCOT.
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in the time of day, week, or season of usage, and is often referred to as a time-of-use
price. For these two types of contracts, the retail price is not directly tied to the
wholesale spot price and thus does not reflect the short-run variation in supply and
demand conditions of the system.5 Besides electric consumption, customers also have
to pay for transmission charges, a fee for the use of the electric grid. The design of
transmission charges is based upon the consumer’s contribution to demand during
four peak times in summer months (Four Coincidental Peaks, 4 CP), thus providing
consumers with an incentive to reduce their power purchases during the summer
peaks. (Zarnikau, 2010) This transmission charge introduces a complication for the
empirical work since reductions in consumption during summer peak time may be
partially driven by consumers trying to avoid the transmission fee. These reductions
will not be distinguishable from reductions driven purely by a high wholesale market
price. Then, we may end up obtaining overestimated demand responsiveness to prices.
TVP typically take one of two forms. Critical peak pricing (CPP) allows prices
to vary with short-run system conditions. Under CPP, the retailer/utility can declare
a day or hour to be a critical peak period, and the price is contracted to be sub-
stantially higher during those episodes. In some cases, the critical peak price may be
the wholesale spot price for that period. CPP contracts typically limit the number
of times that the retailer/utility can declare critical peak periods. Real-time pricing
(RTP) passes the wholesale spot price along to customers. Either of the time-varying
contracts could hedge a customer against price risk for a portion of the consumption
but still expose the customer to the spot price on the margin. The existing liter-
ature has detailed descriptions of the types of retail pricing schemes (for example,
see Borenstein (2005)). Retail prices under such bilaterally negotiated contracts will
5For a description of demand response in ERCOT, see Zarnikau (2010).
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reflect factors such as wholesale prices, premia paid to avoid risk, and transmission
and distribution charges by the distribution utility. For instance, a retailer offering
a time-varying price contract to a particular customer will pass the risk involved in
having unexpectedly high wholesale prices. At the same time, a customer entering
into a time-varying price contract will have the opportunity to save costs by curtailing
demand at peak times, or reallocating consumption within the day.
The Texas wholesale market consists of bilateral trades between generators and
end users in addition to a small balancing market run by the grid operator. Bilateral
transactions are conducted in over-the-counter markets such as the Intercontinental
Exchange (ICE) and then physically scheduled with the grid operator about one
day before production and consumption. In order to ensure that supply and demand
balance in real-time, ERCOT operators an hourly bid-based auction for “balancing
power” with prices formed every 15 minutes. We will use this balancing price as
our measure of the wholesale spot price for each 15-minute interval. At times, the
transmission system becomes congested, and wholesale prices differ by location to
ensure system balance. During our sample period, the electric grid was divided into
zones which could have different prices during congested intervals. Figure 2 illustrates
the four zones in 2008. The zonal boundaries were largely determined by the topology
of the grid, and these boundaries would change slightly from year to year as the
location of demand and generators changed.6 An advantage of this institutional setting
is that provides an additional source of variation for price for the identification of the
demand response parameters.
Wholesale prices change substantially over time – even over the course of a single
day – reflecting changes in demand that require more expensive generators to come
6For a detailed description of the operation of the Texas wholesale market, see
Kiesling and Kleit (2009).
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Figure 2. Transmission Congestion Zones in 2008
Source: Electric Reliability Council of Texas (2010).
on-line. Figure 2 shows different quantiles of the wholesale price over the course of
the year and a day. The top panel of Figure 3 plots the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile
of interval-level prices for each week of 2008 in the Houston zone. During the high
demand summer months, the 95th percentile price can be up to five times larger than
the 5th percentile price. But even during the relatively low demand non-summer
months, upper quantiles of prices are over twice as large as lower quantile prices.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 plots quantiles of prices for each of the 96 15-minute
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intervals of the day. Prices vary considerably over the course of a typical day with
prices in the afternoon and evening hours often exceeding $100/MWh (or 10 cents
per kwh).
C. Data
We use a unique dataset of individual customer-level data for virtually all commercial
and industrial (C&I) customers with interval data recorders (IDR) during the sample
period.7 ERCOT provided us with data on the electricity consumption for 8,537 C&I
customers that are metered with interval data recorders that allow the distribution
utility to record consumption every 15 minute interval. These customers represent ap-
proximately 20% of the total energy load in ERCOT8 and the 33% of the C&I energy
consumption in Texas.9 For each of these customers, our data includes consumption
for each 15 minute interval from October 2007 to September 2008.
For each customer, ERCOT provided us with information about the contract
between the customer and its retailer. ERCOT requested that each retailer identify
for each of the retailer’s customers whether the contract provided “a financial incentive
or requirement to reduce consumption in response to high wholesale spot prices.” In
particular, the retailers were asked to provide an indicator of whether the contract
included either real-time pricing, critical peak pricing, or any other pricing structure
7During the sample period, all customers with a peak demand higher than 700 kW
were required by ERCOT to have an interval data recorder installed. The compliance
rate for this requirement was almost universal. Customers were also allowed to request
voluntarily the installation of these devices.
8In the year 2008, total ERCOT energy load was 312,401,085 MWh. The total
consumption of the C&I customers considered in the sample from October 2007 to
September 2008 is 72,157,498 MWh (ERCOT).
9The total electric industry retail sales in Texas were 347,059,000 MWh in the year
2008 (Energy Information Administration). This includes some areas outside ERCOT.
The 63% of these sales went to C&I customers, which account for 219,279,000 MWh.
The total consumption of firms in the sample represent 33% of this number.
49
Figure 3. Patterns in Annual and Daily Wholesale Spot Prices
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that created incentives to reduce demand when balancing market prices rose. 10 This
measure of exposure to time-varying prices is for a single snapshot in time – the
survey response was due to ERCOT on April 1, 2009. We assume that the contract
in place when the retailer responded to the survey had similar properties as the
contracts governing our sample period of October 2007 – September 2008. According
to this metric, approximately 15% of customers were on time-varying prices. However
large customers are more likely to face time-varying prices; 30% of C&I load faces
time-varying prices.
This information on exposure to wholesale spot prices suggests that these cus-
tomers may respond to spot prices, but it does not provide sufficient information to
suggest the functional form of the response. To see this, consider a customer with
a critical peak pricing contract. This customer has incentives to reduce demand in
periods defined by the retailer to be a critical peak period, but we have no infor-
mation on when those periods occur. To state the problem slightly differently, the
customer faces a highly non-linear tariff and we do not know the form of that tariff.
For customers with a real-time pricing contract, this issue is less of a concern. As
long as the customer is paying the spot price for marginal sales and the customer
responds to marginal prices, one would expect customers to face increasing incentives
to reduce demand for any price increase.11 Absent any additional information on the
function form of tariffs, our empirical specification below uses an assumed smooth
consumption response to wholesale spot price.
Customers may also sell curtailing capacity though agreements known as Loads
Acting as Resources (LaaRs), either to ERCOT or directly to load-serving entities.
10The full text of the survey instrument is included in the Appendix E.
11See Ito (2012) for an analysis suggesting that residential customers may respond
more to average prices than marginal prices.
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As of the end of 2008, 144 firms were qualified to provide load curtailment capacity,
with 5 of them concentrating about one-half of the total curtail capacity (more than
100MW). (Zarnikau, 2010) Typically, LaaRS are called to reduce load three times a
year. Another alternative for selling curtailment capacity is the Emergency Interrupt-
ible Load Service (EILS). Under EILS, interruptible loads which are not providing an
operating reserve receive a payment for curtailing consumption within a 30-minute of
ERCOT declaring an emergency. (Zarnikau, 2010) Both programs introduce a chal-
lenge for the empirical estimation, since during high-prices episodes non TVP firms
can reduce consumption because of their participation in these programs, and TVP
firms could not reduce consumption or do it only marginally in order to preserve their
curtailment capacity already under contract. Unfortunately, we do not have informa-
tion on which firms participate in EILS. The days when LaaRs episodes occurred
were excluded from the sample.
Our data also include each customer’s street address that we match to firm char-
acteristics using ReferenceUSA. This matching process was individually time con-
suming, so we chose to focus on matching only the biggest customers to maximize
the matching ratio. Our sample consists of 1700 customers with the largest annual
consumption. They represent around 75% of the total consumption recorded in the
sample. This matching provides us with customer-level measures of industry type
(NAICS code), number of employees, the square footage of the establishment, and
latitude/longitude. We were able to successfully match address to firm characteristics
for approximately 950 (55%) of the biggest 1,700 C&I customers. Table 10 presents
the distribution of firms by type of tariff, for the whole and the selected sample.
Finally, we also used temperature data, obtained from the National Climatic
Data Center. We used data collected from 63 different stations across the ERCOT
region, assigning to each customer the information from the closest station. The
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Table 10—Whole Sample and Selected Sample for Firm Information Matching
ESIID Total Consumption (GWh)
Whole Sample 8,590 72,157
TVP 1,255 15% 21,768 30%
Non TVP 7,335 85% 50,389 70%
Selected Sample 1,690 54,011
TVP 340 20% 18,749 35%
Non TVP 1,350 80% 35,262 65%
frequency of these data is per minute. We opted for considering for each interval the
“central” minute. (minutes 7, 23, 37, and 53, respectively)
The total amount of C&I consumption (metered with IDRs) subject to time-
varying prices has a flatter daily load profile that the C&I consumption not facing
TVP. This is illustrated in Figure 4 which shows the average daily aggregate con-
sumption profile for customers on TVP and those not on TVP. Customers not facing
TVP have a daily load shape that peaks later in the day and exhibits a higher peak
to trough ratio than TVP customers.
D. Methodology
1. Generalized Mc Fadden Cost Function
To obtain the effect of prices on electricity consumption we estimate jointly the con-
ditional input demands (CID) for the 96 intervals of the day, following and modifying
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Figure 4. Average Daily Aggregate Consumption Profile for TVP and Non-TVP Cus-
tomers
Patrick and Wolak’s (2001) methodology. The CID used for the estimation are derived
from a Generalized Mc Fadden (GMF) cost function. We opt for this cost function
among many other used in the literature because of its consistency with the condi-
tions imposed by the microeconomic theory. In addition to satisfy homogeneity of
degree one in input prices, this specification can satisify the concavity in input prices,
which can not be guaranteed using other common cost functions, like the Trans-log
or Generalized Leontief functions.12 In intuitive terms, homegeneity of degree one
implies that if all input prices increase in certain proportion, total cost will increase
12See Diewert and Wales (1987) for a more detailed discussion.
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by the same proportion as well. Concavity in input prices imply that if the price of
one particular input increases, total cost will increase, but less than proportionally.
In this case, the firm can substitute the use of that input for other cheaper ones. This
second condition is particularly relevant in this study, since we want to allow firms
to shift consumption across intervals within the day.
A general specification of the GMF cost function, as defined in Diewert and
Wales (1987), is as follows:
C1 (p, y) =
[
1
2
(
p−11
) k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
cijpipj
]
y +
k∑
i=1
biipiy +
k∑
i=1
bipi (3.1)
where pl is the price of input l, y is the level of production of the firm, and c·, and b·
are parameters to be obtained from the empirical estimation. Homogeneity of degree
one in input prices can be easily proven, by multiplying by the same scalar all the
input prices. To guarantee concavity in prices, however, we have to impose certain
constraints. To do this, we define a matrix C as a symmetric matrix composed by
the cij terms, placed in the respective row and column according to its subindex.
Concavity in input prices can then be imposed by constraining this matrix C to be
negative semi-definite. To do this, we follow the strategy developed by Lau (1978)
to impose positive semi-definitiveness in symmetric matrices. This strategy consists
in obtaining C as a function of two other matrices: a lower triangular matrix (B)
with ones in the main diagonal, and a nonnegative diagonal matrix (D). As far as the
symmetric matrix can be expressed as a function of these two other matrices, positive
semi-definitiveness is guaranteed. In our particular case, since we want to impose
negative semi-definitiveness, we add a negative sign at the front of the function.
Then, C has be obtained as:
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C = − (BD) (BD)′ (3.2)
Under this specification, C will always satisfy negative semi-definitiveness, and
the values off the main diagonal of C may take positive or negative values, meaning
that we are allowing for substitutability or complementarity between inputs.
For the actual estimation, as in Patrick and Wolak (2001), we assume that man-
agers seek to minimize total costs of production for the next day, given the expectation
of electricity prices for the 96 intervals. We use a modified GMF cost function, which
can be expressed as follows (for firm k in day d):
Ckd (p, y) =
[
1
2
96∑
i=1
96∑
j=1
cijpidpjd
]
yd +
96∑
i=1
biipidyd+
96∑
i=1
bipid +
96∑
i=1
[dif (Wid) + θFk + Uikd] pid (3.3)
The first three terms on the right-hand side come from the general GMF specifi-
cation stated lines above. The first term differs from the general specification in that
there is not an input price dividing the expression. This is equivalent to lifting the
condition of degree one in input prices, or to assume that the aggregate price index
of the other inputs of production is constant during the sample period. We prefer to
continue using this specification and lifting the degree one condition because the most
important condition in this study is the concavity in input prices. We do this also
because the alternatives to address this issue did not result in satisfactory outcomes.
We could include one of the input prices as denominator, but there is no reason a
priori to select a particular one among the 96 intervals. Moreover, including different
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ones may result in different estimates. A solution to this problem is using the Sym-
metric Generalized Mc Fadden function, as suggested in Diewert and Wales (1987),
but the results obtained were not satisfactory.
The last term is included to capture unobserved determinants of customer-level
demand that may be correlated with prices. Its inclusion does not affect the com-
pliance with the conditions imposed by the microeconomic theory. We can see more
clearly the reason for its inclusion after obtaining the CID. From Shephard’s Lemma
we know that the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to each input
price will result in the CID:
∂Ckd (p, y)
∂pid
= Eikd (p, y) (3.4)
Given the defined cost function, we obtain the following CID for input i:
Eikd (p, y) =
[
1
2
96∑
j=1
cijpjd + bii
]
yd + bi + dif (Wid) + θFk + Uikd (3.5)
This is the specification we use for the estimation of the 96 CID. The term inside
the brackets, which comes from the GMF general specification, is a linear function
of prices, scaled up or down according to the level of production of the day. (yd)
Given the characteristics of electricity consumption, however, we should be concerned
that unobserved determinants of customer-level demand are correlated with prices.
An ideal setting would be one in which prices are randomized for those customers
subject to TVP. In our setting, wholesale spot prices arise from hourly multi-unit
auctions in which supply and demand bids determine the market price. To deal with
this problem and capture this unobserved determinants is that we include the third
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and fourth terms, aimed to control for unobserved shocks that come from weather
and firm idiosyncrasies.
While this strategy will not necessarily eliminate any confounding unobservables,
we expect bias to be substantially reduced. Even with a rich set of temperature
controls and customer fixed effects, there still could be remaining sources of bias in
our estimates of price response. For example, firms in a large industry respond to
daily industry-specific demand shocks by increasing production and this industry’s
consumption is large enough to affect system prices, then system price could be
correlated with these consumption shocks. As one potential test of this strategy, we
estimate the same model on customers not subject to TVP. Non-TVP customers
are likely to respond to their retail price (which is “fixed”) but not to respond to the
wholesale spot price. If unobservable shocks were correlated with spot prices, then one
could obtain a non-zero coefficient on price despite the fact that non-TVP customers
do not (or should not) respond to wholesale spot prices. However, if a specification
yields a statistically zero coefficient on price, this finding is consistent with (but does
not necessarily imply) that unobservables are uncorrelated with prices.
In this same specification, yd represents the level of production, and in this
context, is the level of production per day by firm. Unfortunately, we do not have
information about firm production. The strategy we use instead to incorporate this
variable in the estimation is to use dummy variables per day. In an ideal setting, we
should include one variable per day by firm, but this implies estimating a very high
number of parameters. The alternative we follow is to use dummy variables per day,
common to all firms. This way, we expect to capture the variations in the cycle of
production during the year for all firms, and jointly with the dummy variables by
firm, approximate the level of production of the firm per day.
The actual estimation consists on estimating the system of 96 CID, where one
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observation of the system corresponds to one firm in one day. The total number of
systems we use for the estimation is equal to the number of firms multiplied by the
number of days in the sample. Along the firm dimension, prices vary when there are
congestion episodes and firms are located in different zones. Along the day dimension,
prices vary according to the pattern of variation during the year. The first source of
variation is more likely to be uncorrelated to unobserved factors, while the second
one is more likely to be endogenous.
We should note also that firms may be reducing consumption to avoid the trans-
mission fee, which is calculated based on the peak consumption for each month during
the summer months. Then, we may have that our price parameters may not only be
capturing the effect of higher prices, but also the effect of the possibility of being
charged the transmission fee. In this case, both effects point in the same direction,
and our estimated may be biased upward, in absolute value. This would be also the
case if emergency curtailment episodes called by the system (EILS) are correlated
with prices. For the case of LaaRs episodes discussed above, we know when they
occurred, so we decided to exclude those days from the sample.
The error term from the system of equations is very likely be correlated across
CID and across firms. The first form of correlation comes from the fact that unob-
served factors can induce firms to consume more or less electricity during certain
blocks of time, or during whole days. For instance, firms producing mainly based
on orders, or that concentrate production during certain periods of the day due to
idiosyncracies of the industry, will have increases in consumption for blocks that
cannot be explained by the observable variables. This problem is identical to the one
addressed by the seemingly unrelated equations (SUR) framework. Patrick and Wolak
(2001) addressed this issue by estimating the equations under the assumption of error
terms coming from a multivariate normal distributions. Zarnikau and Hallet (2008)
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used a feasible generalized least squared estimator for SUR models.
The second form of error correlation (across firms) has not been addressed in
the literature. This correlation comes from the fact that it may exist system-wide or
regional shocks that make consumption vary across all firms in the system or region
for specific intervals, or blocks of intervals. For instance, if at the beginning or the
end of the work day firms across the state turn on or turn off machinery, then there is
an unobservable component correlated across firms at specific intervals. In practice,
this implies a more general form for the error term that needs to be modeled to
obtain consistent estimators. The results presented below are obtained by minimizing
squared errors assuming independent CID.
We should note also that our measure of price is the realized price that arises
from the balancing market auction for bids that can be submitted up to 15 minutes
before the interval. As a result, this price is not perfectly forecastable within an hour
before and certainly not several days before the interval. If firms require a large lead
time to adjust demand to price, then a more appropriate measure of price is the
firm’s forecast of price at the time when demand adjustment decisions are made.
Unfortunately, we do not have information about the timing of firms’ adjustment
decisions. Thus, in this paper, we use the realized price.
Finally, we recognize that there are factors, like measurement errors, bounded
rationality, rigidities, and transaction costs, that may introduce noise in the relation-
ships we are trying to identify empirically, especially after imposing restrictions in
the possible values parameters can take.
2. Reducing the Number of Parameters
A challenge we face for the empirical estimation is the high number of parameters
to be obtained. Estimating the system of 96 CID implies obtaining 4,656 cij param-
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eters, one estimate of bii, bi, and di by each of the 96 equations, and the fixed effect
by firm. Estimating directly all these parameters is too complicated. To circumvent
this problem, we opted to reduce the number of parameters to be obtained in the
estimation, following the strategy used by Patrick and Wolak (2001). This strategy
consist in using Fourier series to estimate indirectly series of parameters, reducing
considerably the necessary number of parameters to be obtained from the estimation.
To see this strategy in detail, remember that as defined in (3.2):
C = [cij] = − (LD) (LD)′ (3.6)
where L is a lower triangular matrix and D is a diagonal matrix. Then, in order to
reduce the number of parameter to be estimated, we can define each term of the 96
terms of main diagonal of D as:
δi = α0 +
5∑
m=1
αmcos
(
m
2pi
96
i
)
+
5∑
m=1
αm+5sin
(
m
2pi
96
i
)
(3.7)
In this case, we do not have to obtain directly all the parameters in the estimation,
but we only need to obtain the α’s. Once we identify them, we can reconstruct the δ
parameters. An assumption behind this procedure is that the series of δ parameters
({δ1, δ2, ..., δ96}) is smooth enough as to be captured by a weighted combination of
waves of different magnitude (sinus and cosinus functions).
In a similar fashion, for the matrix L we define each term below the main diagonal
of L (95×94
2
terms) as:
lij = λ
1
i ∗ λ2j (3.8)
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where each of the λ terms is defined as:
λ1i = β0 +
5∑
m=1
βmcos
(
m
2pi
95
i
)
+
5∑
m=1
βm+5sin
(
m
2pi
95
i
)
(3.9)
λ2j = γ0 +
5∑
m=1
γmcos
(
m
2pi
95
i
)
+
5∑
m=1
γm+5sin
(
m
2pi
95
i
)
(3.10)
This way we need to estimate only the α, β and γ parameters, and recover the the
matrix C using only 33 parameters. We use the same approach for bii, bi and d
′
i, where
a generic term ηi, such that ηi = {bii, bi, d′i}, is defined as:
ηi = ρ0 +
5∑
m=1
ρmcos
(
m
2pi
96
i
)
+
5∑
m=1
ρm+5sin
(
m
2pi
96
i
)
(3.11)
We use this same approach for reducing the number of parameters necesary to esti-
mate yd when we used the whole year of information avaiable, as it will be described
in detail below. In this case, our strategy is to estimate these parameters as the
components of a Fourier series defined as follows:
yd = 1 +
20∑
m=1
φmcos
(
m
2pi
#days
d
)
+
20∑
m=1
φm+5sin
(
m
2pi
#days
d
)
(3.12)
3. Elasticities
Once the parameters have been obtained from the estimation of the system of 96
equations, we can obtain the price elasticities as:
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eikd =
∂Eikd (p, y)
∂pid
× pid
Eikd
= cijyd × pid
Eikd
(3.13)
This means that we obtain one price elasticity estimate by each firm and day of
the year combination. At the same time, intervals where firms had zero consumption
cannot be considered to recover the elasticities.
E. Results
1. Take-up of Contracts with TVP
The take-up of contracts with time-varying prices in our sample is summarized in
Table 11. In our sample of the 1700 largest customers, 20% of C&I customers face
time-varying prices. However those customers are concentrated among large users –
slightly over one-third of customers are subject to TVP when weighted by consump-
tion. There is a modest variation in the geographic take-up of TVP. If customers are
not weighted by consumption, the West zone – the zone with the most wind gen-
eration – has slightly higher take-up than other zones. However, when weighting by
consumption to account for the fact that larger customers are more likely to choose
TVP, the zones with the largest number of TVP customers are the Houston and South
zones.
Table 12 summarizes take-up rates by industry. We summarize industry using
two digit NAICS codes. Industries vary widely in the use of TVP. Approximately
half of firms in transportation sectors of air, rail, water, truck, ground passenger,
pipeline, and sightseeing choose contracts with TVP. About a quarter to a third of
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Table 11—TVP Take Up by Congestion Zone
Unweighted Consumption Weighted
All 20% 35%
Houston 20% 41%
North 18% 25%
South 25% 39%
West 26% 31%
Notes: Zones are defined as the 2008 congestion
management zones.
firms have TVP contracts in Manufacturing, certain types of retail stores, and postal
and warehousing services. At the other extreme, take-up of TVP is very small in
sectors such as Mining, Construction, Real Estate, and Professional Services.
2. Own Price Elasticities by Firm Size
To obtain the price elasticities we decided to focus on the moments when there was
a solid incentive to curtail electricity consumption. Hence, we analyzed only the days
during the summer of 2008 when unusually high prices occurred. The criteria used for
defining an unusually high price was 1.5 times the standard deviation above the mean
price for the interval and congestion zone (Houston, North, West, South). Using this
criteria, 50 days out of the 91 days were selected. The number of days selected by
congestion zone can be seen at Table 13. 13
13The detail of the days selected by congestion zone and interval can be found at
the Appendix F.
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Table 12—TVP Take Up by Industry
Unweighted
Consumption
Weighted
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting * *
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extr. 8% 4%
Utilities 20% 4%
Construction 13% 6%
Manufacturing- Food, Bev, Textile, Apparel, 34% 40%
Leather
Manufacturing- Wood, Paper, Printing, 26% 50%
Petroleum/Coal, Chemical, Plastic,
Nonmetallic
Manufacturing- Primary/Fabricated Metals, 15% 52%
Machinery, Computer Electronics,
Elec. Equip, Transp., Furniture
Wholesale Trade 21% 37%
Retail Trade- Stores: Auto Parts, Furniture, 18% 12%
Electronics, Building Materials,
Food/Bev, Health, Gas Stations,
Clothing
Retail Trade- Stores: Sporting Goods, Books, 40% 62%
Merchandise, Misc. Retailers,
Non-store retailers
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Table 12—Continued
Unweighted Cons. Weighted
Transportation and Warehousing: Air, Rail, 52% 67%
Water, Truck, Ground Passenger,
Pipeline, Sightseeing, Support
Transportation and Warehousing: Postal, 25% 20%
Courier, Warehousing and Storage
Information * *
Finance and Insurance 22% 18%
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 12% 8%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 12% 7%
Management of Companies and Enterprises * *
Administrative & Support & Waste Mgmt & 20% 38%
Remediation Svcs
Educational Services * *
Health Care and Social Assistance 9% 10%
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation * *
Accommodation and Food Services 17% 13%
Other Services (except Public Administration) 29% 12%
Public Administration * *
Unclassified 10% 18%
Notes: This table contains the fraction of customers that are exposed to time-
varying prices for each category among the largest 1700 C&I customers.
* Omitted for confidentiality.
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Table 13—Days Selected for Empirical Estimation
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Price Std. Dev. Days Mean Price Std. Dev.
Houston 91 0.0971 0.0421 43 0.1214 0.0491
North 91 0.0900 0.0346 42 0.1082 0.0423
South 91 0.1019 0.0535 44 0.1304 0.0644
West 91 0.0821 0.0405 34 0.1071 0.0478
Total 91 0.0928 0.0437 50 0.1175 0.0523
Note: Price expressed as dollars per kilo-Watt hour. ($/kWH)
Next, we used the firm’s electricity consumption data from June 2008 to August
2008 to construct 4 quartiles based on total electricity consumption during this period.
By doing this, we divided the firms in our sample in four groups by size, using
electricity consumption as a metric. This way we gain more homogeneity in the sample
of firms used for the estimation, which may facilitate the estimation of the parameters.
Table 14 shows the characteristics of the quartiles obtained from the sample.
We added the temperature information collected from 63 weather stations spread
over Texas. In order to reduce the estimation time, we used a random sample of 100
firms for each quartile and type of tariff (TVP or non TVP). After obtaining the
system parameters, we recovered the elasticities, one by each firm and day considered
in the sample. Figure 5 shows the median value of the own-price elasticities obtained,
by quartile and type of tariff.14
14The estimation did not include the estimation of standard errors.
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Table 14—Total kWH Consumption per Day by Firm Size
Quartile Firms Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
Smallest 2,137 179.1 123.2 0.0 171.3 400.0
2 2,136 644.0 142.8 400.1 643.3 892.1
3 2,136 1,195.7 200.0 892.5 1,169.2 1,608.1
Biggest 2,136 7,106.5 19,529.3 1,610.5 2,804.2 496,423.1
Total 8,545 2,281.1 10,159.4 0.0 892.1 496,423.1
We can obtain some important conclusions from these results. First, the esti-
mated magnitudes of elasticity are modest. All the reported median values are below
0.02 in absolute value, with most of them being below 0.01. This result is consistent
with previous results in the literature. For instance, Zarnikau & Hallet (2008) find
that aggregate own-price elasticity of demand in ERCOT is -0.000008, while Zarnikau
et al. (2007) find that the 20 largest customers in Houston have no significant response
to prices.
The only sizeable own-price elasticities are observed in the second quartile for non
TVP firms, and in the biggest quartile for TVP firms. In the first case, firms are more
elastic around noon and 9 p.m. However, it is difficult to explain why the non TVP
firms are showing some elasticity. This result may be an indication that unobservable
factors correlated with prices are particularly strong in this subsample. The second
group that shows a sizeable elasticity is the group of biggest firms, where firms show to
be more elastic during the late afternoon, which coincides with peak electricity prices.
Back of the envelope estimations indicate, however, that the absolute magnitude of
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(a) First Quartile (Smallest Firms)
(b) Second Quartile
Figure 5. Median Own Price Elasticity of Electricity by Firm Size
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(c) Third Quartile
(d) Fourth Quartile (Biggest Firms)
Figure 5. Continued
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consumption reduction is very small. An increment of 10 cents in the price per kWH,
will lead to a reduction in total demand in the interval between 4pm and 5pm of
9MWh. Compared to the average total sytem demand for that same time period
during high prices episodes (around 56 GWH), the reduction obtained is very small,
being only 0.016% of the aggregate.15
As a check that these results are driven by the parameters obtained from the esti-
mation and not by the price/quantity ratio or the values of the dummies per day (yd),
we reported the values of the main diagonal of C in Figure 6. They all are different
from zero, and show different patterns. Their magnitude increases from the lowest
to the highest quartile, which is consistent with the size of firms increasing across
quartiles. If these parameters were close to zero, that would indicate the functional
form cannot capture adequately the relationship between prices and quantities.
3. Own Price Elasticities by Industry
Next, we were interested to see if, even when magnitudes obtained are small, some
industries are more responsive to electricity prices than others. We would expect
capital-intensive industries which use energy-intensive machinery to be more respon-
sive, granted that they have enough flexibility to curtail electricity consumption when
necessary.
For this section we had to restrict our analysis to the firms for which we obtained
the characteristics of the firm, including the NAICS code. This reduced the number of
observations considerably, so we decided to extend the time interval to the whole year,
instead of the price peak times during the summer. Then, we restricted our analysis
15We assumed an average consumption by firm in the quartile of 3.76 MWh from
4pm to 5pm, and an average mean price of US$1.8 per kWH. The intervals considered
to obtain this values are only the high price episodes, defined as at least 1.5 times
the standard deviation above the mean.
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to the industries for which we had at least five firms in each tariff regime. We decided
to work at the 3-digit level NAICS code because we wanted to ensure homogeneity
of the firms within each selected industry, but have also a decent number of firms in
the sample16. The sample of industries analyzed and the type of tariff participation
is described in Table 15. The median elasticities obtained are presented in the Figure
7.
The graphs where scaled from 0 to -0.10, when possible. A first reading shows
that for the selected sample of industries, the non TVP firms have in all cases null
responsiveness to electricity prices. We double checked that the elasticity estimates
were driven by the cij parameters and not by the other terms of the elasticity estimate.
Analyzing each graph obtained we see that for most of them the magnitude of the
elasticity obtained is very small, consistent with the results obtained by quartile. In
two industries, the elasticities obtained were positive, but this result was driven by the
yd parameters. Two of the industries (331 and 423) show an increase in the magnitude
of the elasticity by the end of the day, a result that is difficult to interpret in intuitive
terms. Overall, the size of the obtained elasticities are very small in absolue value.
F. Conclusions
We impose a functional form derived from microeconomic theory to estimate the
responsiveness of demand for electricity in a sample of commercial and industrial
customer in Texas. The results show, first, that an opt-in type of program can reach
a considerable share of participation for real-time pricing tariffs. 20% of customers
with more than 700 kW peak load during the day signed for this program, which
increases to 35% when weighted by consumption during the year.
16The defintion of each NAICS category selected can be found at the Appendix G.
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(i) NAICS 541: Professional, Scientific and Technical Services
Figure 7. Continued
Secondly, we found that the magnitude of the own price elasticities of demand are
not significant in economic terms. Estimations performed by firm size and by industry
showed that the magnitude was only in few cases bigger than 0.01 in absolute value.
A back of the envelope estimation showed that for the group where the elasticity
reaches -0.02, the reduction in consumption for an increase of 10 cents in the price
of electricity per kWH is negligible. The industry-level estimations also showed very
small response, and consistently demonstrated that customers under non TVP do
not react to electricity prices. All these results show that the expected potential of
real-time pricing for inducing reductions in consumption in the short-run is still not
realized.
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CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY
In Chapter II, I test for the existence of false positives among inspections from the At-
lanta vehicular emission inspection program between April 2002 and December 2003.
I also test whether this incidence is a function of the number of local competitors for
each station. The specific form of test manipulation tested consists of using a satis-
factory vehicle to obtain a passing result for another vehicle. I used two approaches
to detect test manipulations: a reduced-form approach following the methodology de-
veloped by Oliva(2010), and a switching regression model approach, aimed to assign
probabilities of clean-piping to each inspection performed. I estimate the incidence
of test fraud (clean piping) to be 9% of the passing inspections during the sample
period. Moreover, a linear regression of the predicted probabilities of clean-piping per
inspection against the number of competitors for the inspecting station demonstrates
that the incidence of clean piping per station increases by 0.7% with one more com-
petitor within a 0.5 mile radius. These results show that increased competition can
lead to outcomes detrimental to society when there are asymmetries of information
and the incentives are not properly aligned for all the participants in the market.
These effects must also be considered when designing new markets, as was the case
for the vehicular emission inspection market.
In Chapter III, we test whether electricity consumption by industrial and com-
mercial customers responds to real-time prices after these firms sign-up for prices
linked to the electricity wholesale market price. As in Patrick and Wolak (2001), we
impose a functional form derived from microeconomic theory in order to estimate
the responsiveness of demand for electricity in a sample of commercial and industrial
customers in Texas. The results show, first, that an opt-in type of program can reach
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a considerable share of participation for real-time pricing tariffs. 20% of customers
with more than 700 kW peak load during the day signed up for this program. This
share increases to 35% when weighted by consumption during the year.
Secondly, we found that the magnitude of the elasticities of demand are not
significant in economic terms. Estimations performed by firm size and by industry
showed that the magnitude was only in few cases larger than 0.01 in absolute value.
A back of the envelope estimation showed that for the group where the own price
elasticity reaches -0.02, the reduction in consumption for an increase of 10 cents
in the price of electricity per kWH is negligible. The industry-level estimations also
showed very small response, but also consistently demonstrated that customers under
non TVP do not react to electricity prices. All these results show that the expected
potential of real-time pricing for inducing reductions in consumption in the short-run
is still not realized.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES OF ϕ˜
To proof the asymptotic properties of ϕ˜, we start from (2.5):
ri = mi [ri−1 + (Zi − Zi−1) γ] + (1−mi) [Xiβ + Ziγ] + ui
where
ui = mi [εi − ei−1] + (1−mi) [ei]
we re-express (2.5) in matrix form. Define the matrix M as an nxn matrix such that
M = I ∗m, where m is a vector containing all the miterms. Define also the matrices
r, r−1, X, Z, Zd, and u as the matrices resulting from stacking each observation from
ri , ri−1, Xi , Zi, (Zi − Zi−1), and ui. The resulting expression is:
r = Mr−1 +MZdγ + (I −M)Xβ + (I −M)Zγ + u (A.1)
where I is the nxn identity matrix. If we estimate (A.1) by OLS, the resulting ex-
pression, using matrix notation is:
r = ϕ˜r−1 + Zdγ˜ +Xβ˜ + Zγˆ
= ϕ˜r−1 + V θ˜
Then, the OLS estimator for ϕ˜ can be expressed as:
ϕ˜OLS = (r′−1(I − PV )r−1)−1r′−1(I − PV )r
where Pv = V (V
′V )−1 V ′. Replacing r by its components according to (A.1), we have
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that:
ϕ˜OLS = (r′−1(I − PV )r−1)−1r′−1(I − PV )Mr−1
+ (r−1(I − PV )r′−1)−1r−1(I − PV )MZdγ˜
+ (r−1(I − PV )r′−1)−1r−1(I − PV ) (I −M)Xβ˜
+ (r−1(I − PV )r′−1)−1r−1(I − PV ) (I −M)Zγˆ
+ (r−1(I − PV )r′−1)−1r−1(I − PV )u
Under H0 all the elements of M are equal to zero, and u = e. Also, remember that X
and Z are components of V , so they belong to the span of V . Hence, we have that:
ϕ˜OLS
H0= (r−1(I − PV )r′−1)−1r−1(I − PV )e
Then, to have ϕ˜OLS equal to zero in expectation under the null hypothesis, we need
each component of V to be orthogonal to e. In other words, we need the following
sufficient conditions to be satisfied:
Condition 1 E
[
r′−1e
]
= 0
Condition 2 E
[
Zd
′
e
]
= 0
Condition 3 E [X ′e] = 0
Condition 4 E [Z ′e] = 0
Regarding condition 1, since the null hypothesis holds, we can replace r−1 by its com-
ponents, according to 2.8. Condition 1 will be satisfied then if the following conditions
are satisfied: Condition 1.1 E [Xi−1ei] = 0 Condition 1.2 E [Zi−1ei] = 0 Condition
1.3 E [ei−1ei] = 0 Conditions 1.1 and 1.3 are the same that the assumptions (A1) and
(A2) discussed by Oliva (2010). To have condition 1.1 not to hold, an observable char-
acteristic of the car ahead in line (Xi−1) should create a systematic noise in the honest
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reading of the next inspection. For instance, a big engine or a high odometer reading
from a vehicle creating an effect on the next gas reading that cannot be explained
by the observable characteristics of the next vehicle. For condition 1.3 not to hold,
consecutive honest inspections should have a common systematic deviation from the
predicted value from observable characteristics. If this deviation were common to all
the vehicles in a single station, this effect will be captured by station fixed effects. If
it is not common to all the vehicles, but to a subset of them, and it is not correlated
with any of the observable variables, it can potentially be a problem. I assume that
none of these cases occur, so that conditions 1.1 and 1.3 hold.
Condition 1.2 will be satisfied if the error term is not related with the contex-
tual variables that affect the readings of the car ahead in line. Zi−1 is composed of
two set of variables, environmental (Zenvi−1) and dynamometer-resistance determinants
(Zdyni−1 ). Since the null hypothesis holds, dynamometer-resistance determinants (Z
dyn
i−1 )
are a subset of Xi−1, and they are non correlated with the eit if condition 1.1 holds.
Then, condition 1.2 will not be satisfied for Zenvi−1 if temperature or humidity have a
systematic effect on the readings of the next car in line. For instance, if extremely
hot weather makes the inspectors position the gas reader in some way that affects
the result of the inspection of the next vehicle in line. It can also be the case that
environmental variables do not vary considerably from inspection to inspection. In
this case, the error term from the honest reading must be independent from these
variables. This is, humid or hot days should not induce a systematic error in the
reading, I assume that none of these cases occur, so condition 1.2 holds. Then, under
the assumptions described, condition1 holds.
Condition 2 will be satisfied if the difference between inspection-specific variables
and the error term is not correlated. For this to happen, it is necessary that every
inspection performed after an change in temperature or humidity contain a systematic
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error. The same should happen every time a small-engine car is followed by a big-
engine car. Conditions 3 and 4 are satisfied if e is orthogonal to X and Z, which will
be satisfied if the linear specification, and the variables included are good enough as
to explain the readings, and leave an independent error term. I assume that all these
conditions are satisfied, so that under the null hypothesis, the expectations of ϕ˜OLS
is equal to zero.
Under the alternative hypothesis, at least some of the elements of the main
diagonal of M are equal to one. This implies that the first term in the definition of
ϕ˜OLS is different from zero:
(r′−1(I − PV )r−1)−1r′−1(I − PV )Mr−1 6= 0
so that, regardless of the value of the other terms in the expression, we have that:
E
[
ϕ˜OLS
] H16= 0
Then, the individual significance test for the parameter ϕ will provide information
about the existence of “clean piping” cases in the sample.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF BIAS OF ϕ˜OLS
We want to obtain an unbiased estimator for (2.12):
mˆ0 =
N∑
t
mt
N
To see why ϕ˜OLS is a biased estimator of this mean incidence, remember that it
is obtained from the OLS estimation of (2.6):
ri = ϕ˜ri−1 + (Zi − Zi) γ˜ +Xiβ˜ + Ztγˆ + ui
As mentioned in Oliva(2010), remember that the expression [ri−1 + (Zi − Zi) γ]
is actually a proxy for rcpi in (2.5). Even if this approximation can be very accurate,
there is still some random error not captured by the observable variables. Hence, we
have a case of a variable measured with error, which causes the estimation of ϕ˜OLS
being biased toward zero (attenuation).
However, an even more important problem is the own interpretation of the pa-
rameter obtained from the OLS estimation of (2.6)(in matrix notation):
ϕ˜OLS = (r′−1(I − PV )r−1)−1r′−1(I − PV )r
Replacing r by its components defined in (A.1), we obtain:
ϕ˜OLS = [(r′−1(I − PV )r−1)−1]r′−1(I − PV )
[Mr−1 +MZdγ +M+ (I −M)Xβ + (I −M)Zγ + (I −M) e]
To gain some intuition, suppose that r−1is orthogonal to V , and that M is orthogonal
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to r−1 (or mi is independent from ri−1). Then, the first term of ϕ˜OLS will become:
N∑
i=1
mir
2
i−1
N∑
i=1
r2i−1
(B.1)
As is, B.1 can be an estimator for the mean incidence, given that on average the
ri−1 included and excluded from the denominator have the same magnitude. However,
even when (I − Pv) cancels out with X, and Z; and Pv does with e; the remaining
terms do not vanish automatically and impose a bias in the mean estimator:
E [bias] = [(r′−1r−1)
−1]E
[
r′−1[MZ
dγ +M−MXβ −MZγ −Me]] (B.2)
This term is difficult to interpret and to determine the direction of the bias. Moreover,
if we lift the assumption of r−1being orthogonal to V , then we need to include the
matrix (I − Pv) in the estimation of the numerator and denominator of B.1, which
turns more complicated its interpretation. Oliva (2010) followed a different approach
to determine if the OLS estimator is biased and also found that the estimator will
not be consistent, with a bias of direction difficult to determine.
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APPENDIX C
THE ESTIMATOR FOR THE MEAN INCIDENCE OF CLEAN PIPING (λ)
The estimator for the mean incidence of clean piping (λ) can be explicitly obtained
from the following FOC .
∂L
∂λj
=
Nj∑
i=1
{λj
σ1
exp
(
− 1
2σ21
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ)2
)
+
1− λj
σ2
exp
(
− 1
2σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)2
)
}−1
×{ 1
σ1
exp
(
− 1
2σ21
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ)2
)
− 1
σ2
exp
(
− 1
2σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)2
)
} = 0 (C.1)
Multiplying numerator and denominator by 1√
2pi
we obtain:
∂L
∂λj
=
Nj∑
i=1
1
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
) = 0
where µ1i and µ
2
i are respectively (εi − ei−1) and ei from (2.7).φ (.) is the normal
standard density function. Then, C.1 implies:
Nj∑
i=1
1
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
) = Nj∑
i=1
1
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
) (C.2)
To gain some intuition, consider the case where for a subset of observations
(Nj1) the probability of being a clean piping case is positive (
1
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
> 0) and
the probability of being an honest case is very small ( 1
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
→ 0). For the other
observations (Nj2), consider the opposite situation, the probabilities of being clean
piping are very remote ( 1
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
→ 0), and the probabilities of being honest are
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at least positive ( 1
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
> 0). For having this case, we would need that each
observation is clearly assigned to only one of the possible cases. We will have then
that 2.20 will collapse to:
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj1
1
λj
=
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj2
1
1− λj
Nj1
λj
=
Nj2
1− λj
λj =
Nj1
Nj1 +Nj2
(C.3)
Then, the incidence parameter will represent the share of observations that are
clean piping. In case the specifications assign the same probabilities to each observa-
tion, then C.2 will collapse to the equality Nj = Nj, which implies that any λ will
satisfy the FOC, and the parameter will not be identifiable.
To check which other assumptions are necessary to obtain consistent parameters,
we list the FOC from the log-likelihood function. These FOC are required as regu-
larity conditions in order to apply the usual properties of MLE estimators, including
consistency and asymptotic normality.
The FOC with respect to β is:
∂L
∂β
=
Nj∑
i=1
{λj
σ1
exp
(
− 1
2σ21
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ)2
)
+
1− λj
σ2
exp
(
− 1
2σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)2
)
}−1
{1− λj
σ2
exp
(
− 1
2σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)2
)
1
σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)Xi} = 0 (C.4)
then:
∂L
∂β
=
Nj∑
i=1
1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
1
σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)Xi
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
) = 0
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Considering again the case where we can assign clearly one regime to each observation,
the preceding expression collapses to:
∂L
∂β
=
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj2
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)Xi = 0
For this expression to hold we need the error term in the second specification (honest
cases) to be orthogonal to the Xi. In case both linear specifications receive the same
probability to each observation, the previous condition needs to be true as well, but
for all the observations.
The third FOC that have to hold is:
∂L
∂γ
=
Nj∑
i=1
[
λj
σ1
exp
(
− 1
2σ21
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ)2
)
+
1− λj
σ2
exp
(
− 1
2σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)2
)
]−1
×[λj
σ1
exp
(
− 1
2σ21
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ)2
)
× 1
σ21
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ) (Zi − Zi−1)
+
1− λj
σ2
exp
(
− 1
2σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)2
)
1
σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)Zi] = 0 (C.5)
then:
∂L
∂γ
=
Nj∑
i=1
[
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)
− 1− λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)
]−1
×[ λ
σ1
φ
(
µ1i
σ1
)[
1
σ21
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ) (Zi − Zi−1)
]
+
1− λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2i
σ2
)[
1
σ22
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)Xi
]
] = 0
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Again, under perfect discrimination, we obtain:
∂L
∂γ
=
1
σ21
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj1
(ri − ri−1 − (Zi − Zi−1) γ) (Zi − Zi−1)
+
1
σ22
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj2
(ri −Xiβ − Ziγ)Xi = 0
So, a sufficient condition to satisfy this FOC is that the error terms from each speci-
fication have to be orthogonal to the variables (Zt−Zt−1) for the manipulation cases,
and to Xi for the honest cases. Here also, if both specifications assign the same prob-
ability to each observation, then the previous conditions have to be satisfied for all
the observations of the sample.
Finally, the FOC with respect to the variance estimators are:
∂L
∂σ21
=
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj1
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1it
σ1
) [
1
σ21
(rit − ri−1t−1 − (Zt − Zt−1) γ)2 − 1
]
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1it
σ1
)
− 1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2it
σ2
) = 0
∂L
∂σ22
=
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj2
1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2it
σ2
) [
1
σ22
(rit −Xiβ − Ztγ)2 − 1
]
λj
σ1
φ
(
µ1it
σ1
)
− 1−λj
σ2
φ
(
µ2it
σ2
) = 0
Again, in case observations can be perfectly discriminated by the specification, they
collapse to:
σ21 =
1
Nj
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj1
(rit − ri−1t−1 − (Zt − Zt−1) γ)2
σ22 =
1
Nj
Nj∑
i=1;i∈Nj2
(rit −X iβ − Ztγ)2
As can be seen, the variance estimators are the average squared error terms.
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APPENDIX D
SWITCHING REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS
Table D.1—Switching Regression Model Estimates: Manipulation Equation
Hydro– Carbon Nitric Carbon
carbons Monoxide Oxide Dioxide
Differences in Weight -0.068 0.005 -0.002 0.119
Std. Error 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.032
z-stat -6.692 0.578 -0.365 3.691
Diff. in Weight ˆ 2 0.016 -0.001 -0.044 0.001
0.005 0.004 0.026 0.030
3.172 -0.339 -1.706 0.029
Diff. in Weight ˆ 3 -0.004 0.065 0.063 -0.014
0.002 0.017 0.024 0.013
-1.778 3.732 2.655 -1.099
Diff. in Displacement 0.086 -0.018 -0.010 -0.043
0.010 0.016 0.010 0.015
8.554 -1.134 -0.976 -2.867
Diff. in Displacement ˆ 2 0.012 0.011 0.050 -0.001
0.009 0.007 0.012 0.002
1.346 1.628 4.227 -0.715
continued on next page
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Table D.1—Continued
Hydro– Carbon Nitric Carbon
carbons Monoxide Oxide Dioxide
Diff. in Displacement ˆ 3 -0.006 0.054 -0.021 -0.004
0.004 0.008 0.006 0.001
-1.393 6.754 -3.206 -5.248
Manual Transmission 0.023 0.003 -0.006 -0.001
0.005 0.002 0.003 0.000
4.847 1.943 -2.176 -1.948
Diff. in Temperature 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
4.612 0.588 0.905 0.400
Diff. in Temperature ˆ 2 -0.002 0.000 -0.009 -0.001
0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001
-1.670 0.526 -2.194 -0.784
Diff. in Temperature ˆ 3 -0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000
-0.862 -6.731 0.209 0.929
Diff. in Humidity -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.961
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003
-2.370 0.358 0.235 -360.629
continued on next page
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Table D.1—Continued
Hydro– Carbon Nitric Carbon
carbons Monoxide Oxide Dioxide
Diff. in Humidity ˆ 2 -0.001 0.000 0.128 0.015
0.001 0.000 0.007 0.002
-0.917 -0.348 18.530 8.875
Diff. in Humidity ˆ 3 0.000 -0.008 -0.056 0.005
0.000 0.001 0.004 0.000
0.432 -6.658 -15.663 23.898
Diff. in Dilution Factor 0.086 -0.003 0.005 0.007
0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002
33.229 n/a 12.423 4.295
Diff. in Dilution Factor ˆ 2 -0.030 0.001 -0.022 0.001
0.001 0.000 0.005 0.001
-27.466 n/a -4.051 1.480
Diff. in Dilution Factor ˆ 3 0.003 0.002 0.035 -0.003
0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000
23.071 1.784 13.164 -7.602
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Table D.2—Switching Regression Model Estimates: Honest Equation
Hydro– Carbon Nitric Carbon
carbons Monoxide Oxide Dioxide
Weight -0.023 0.005 -0.006 -0.009
Std. Error 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
z-stat -9.685 8.616 -4.923 -5.594
Weight ˆ 2 0.024 -0.001 -0.033 -0.008
0.001 0.000 0.006 0.001
21.145 -3.275 -5.743 -6.160
Weight ˆ 3 -0.005 -0.013 0.030 0.004
0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001
-8.899 -9.113 6.349 5.781
Displacement 0.015 0.004 -0.001 -0.001
0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
6.097 3.318 -0.604 -1.264
Displacement ˆ 2 -0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.009
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
-1.402 7.461 1.442 -11.543
Displacement ˆ 3 0.007 0.000 0.081 -0.003
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000
6.800 -0.169 30.043 n/a
continued on next page
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Table D.2—Continued
Hydro– Carbon Nitric Carbon
carbons Monoxide Oxide Dioxide
Manual Transmission -0.008 0.018 0.005 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000
-7.502 27.622 2.820 n/a
Odometer 0.037 0.004 -0.001 -0.016
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
31.635 36.658 -6.636 -15.447
Odometer ˆ 2 0.000 0.000 0.151 -0.008
0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001
0.834 n/a 39.426 -6.414
Odometer ˆ 3 0.000 0.030 -0.047 0.004
0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000
-5.471 33.579 -10.095 8.646
Age 0.069 0.014 0.006 0.002
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
42.205 12.286 3.453 0.994
Age ˆ 2 -0.002 -0.008 0.013 0.002
0.002 0.000 0.008 0.002
-0.950 -18.781 1.523 0.977
continued on next page
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Table D.2—Continued
Hydro– Carbon Nitric Carbon
carbons Monoxide Oxide Dioxide
Age ˆ 3 -0.007 -0.003 -0.015 0.000
0.001 0.002 0.017 0.000
-9.253 -1.678 -0.835 n/a
Repairs performed -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
0.003 0.002 0.005 0.000
-0.628 -0.917 -0.408 n/a
Trial number -0.009 -0.001 0.000 -0.010
0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001
-2.614 n/a 0.770 -10.931
Trial number ˆ 2 0.000 0.000 -0.055 -0.024
0.000 0.000 0.033 0.001
n/a n/a -1.684 -45.112
Trial number ˆ 3 0.000 -0.026 0.013 -0.018
0.000 0.026 0.016 0.002
n/a -1.002 0.800 -8.253
Constant -0.075 -0.013 -0.008 -0.011
0.018 0.013 0.007 0.001
-4.280 -0.982 -1.156 -17.001
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Table D.3—Switching Regression Model Estimates: Error Term Variance-
Covariance Matrix
Hydro– Carbon Nitric Carbon
carbons Monoxide Oxide Dioxide
Manipulation Equation Error Term Variance-Covariance Matrix
Hydrocarbons 0.245 0.237 0.191 -0.028
Carbon Monoxide 0.237 0.763 0.091 -0.373
Nitric Oxide 0.191 0.091 1.612 0.084
Carbon Dioxide -0.028 -0.373 0.084 2.857
Honest Equation Error Term Variance-Covariance Matrix
Hydrocarbons 0.052 0.018 0.044 -0.008
Carbon Monoxide 0.018 0.016 0.028 -0.007
Nitric Oxide 0.044 0.028 0.276 -0.012
Carbon Dioxide -0.008 -0.007 -0.012 0.023
Note: Variances and covariances between predicted error terms are reported.
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APPENDIX E
TEXT OF SURVEY TO RETAILERS ASKING FOR IDENTIFICATION OF
CUSTOMERS WITH INCENTIVES TO RESPOND TO WHOLESALE SPOT
PRICES
ERCOT is attempting to improve its understanding of how electric system de-
mand changes during periods of high market prices. Toward this end, ERCOT requests
that each Competitive Retailer (CR) identify its retail customers whose contract in-
cludes a financial incentive or requirement to reduce consumption in response to
high wholesale spot prices. ERCOT will analyze the behavior of these Loads, using
industry-standard load modeling methodologies, to evaluate the amount of load re-
duction that typically occurs when Balancing Energy market prices are unusually
high.
CRs are required to comply with this request by Public Utility Commission of
Texas (PUCT) Substantive Rule 25.505(e)(5), which states: (5) Load serving entities
(LSEs) shall provide ERCOT with complete information on load response capabilities
that are self-arranged or pursuant to bilateral agreements between LSEs and their
customers.
Contractual offerings that provide a financial incentive or requirement for a retail
customer to reduce consumption in response to high wholesale spot prices may include
variations of the following:
• Real-time pricing, in which customers are subject to prices that change every
15 minutes based on the ERCOT Market Clearing Price of Energy (MCPE);
• Critical-peak pricing (CPP), in which customers are encouraged to curtail Load
during periods when MCPEs exceed some threshold value;
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• Any retail pricing structure (including overall discounting) or incentive clause
that provides the retail customer an incentive to reduce load in response to high
MCPEs. (Such load reductions may be triggered or instructed by the REP or
undertaken unilaterally by the customer.)
Please note the following:
• Identify ESI IDs that may be on “hybrid” versions of such plans; for example,
customers that are exposed to market prices only during certain hours, or cus-
tomers that have only a portion of their overall Load subject to price exposure.
• The study applies only to customers who are metered with Interval Data
Recorders (IDRs). There are approximately 11,000 such customers in the com-
petitive choice areas of the ERCOT Region.
• Do not identify ESI IDs for customers subject to Time-of-Use (TOU) pricing
(subject during fixed blocks of hours to different prices that are known in ad-
vance).
• ERCOT’s study is limited to ESI ID numbers. No other customer identification
will be used.
ERCOT will treat all CR-specific data as Protected Information pursuant to the
ERCOT Protocols, Sec. 1.3.1. Aggregated results may be reported to the PUCT,
published by ERCOT, or otherwise released to the public. No results will be released
if the identity of a particular Market Participant or customer may be discerned.
Your response to this questionnaire will assist ERCOT in operating the electric
grid reliably and efficiently. A better understanding of the amount of price responsive
Load in the region will help ERCOT anticipate how the total demand on the electric
system is subject to change during periods of high market prices.
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Attached is an Excel file that includes the list of IDR-metered ESI IDs specific to
your company, as well as an introductory instruction page. Please read the instructions
carefully, and modify the ESI ID worksheet according to the instructions and return
the completed file to @ercot.com by April 1, 2009.
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APPENDIX F
DAYS SELECTED FOR ELASTICITY BY SIZE ESTIMATION
The days utilized for the elasticity by size estimation were during the summer
of 2008 when the prices were unusually high. The criteria used for defining an un-
usually high price was 1.5 times the standard deviation above the mean price for the
interval and congestion zone. Four congestion zones were considered for the ERCOT
region: Houston, North, West, and South. Using this criteria, 50 days between June
and August 2008 were selected. The detail of the days selected by congestion zone
and interval can be found in tables F.1, F.2, F.3 and F.4. The means and standard
deviations correspond to the electricity price between 06/01/2008 and 08/30/2008
and the units are US$ per MWH.
Table F.1—Days Selected by Interval: Houston Congestion Zone
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
1 91 104.9 123.4 3 604.0 526.1
2 91 81.9 20.9 7 124.9 7.5
3 91 74.1 18.8 6 112.1 5.0
4 91 69.2 19.3 5 109.2 2.7
5 91 74.2 22.0 9 118.0 5.9
6 91 70.7 21.1 8 114.2 5.4
7 91 68.2 20.2 8 110.7 7.9
8 91 65.5 19.3 8 105.6 7.3
continued on next page
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Table F.1—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
9 91 64.1 21.0 8 107.2 9.4
10 91 60.8 21.7 8 105.2 10.6
11 91 57.1 21.3 8 99.7 7.5
12 91 54.8 21.0 8 96.0 7.3
13 91 52.6 21.9 7 96.4 7.1
14 91 50.1 21.7 5 95.5 6.5
15 91 49.0 21.3 7 91.6 4.9
16 91 46.6 21.8 7 90.7 4.0
17 91 45.9 21.6 7 92.1 3.8
18 91 45.8 21.4 7 91.6 4.2
19 91 47.4 20.6 8 87.5 7.2
20 91 48.2 20.9 7 88.2 5.4
21 91 46.4 22.6 9 86.5 5.9
22 91 48.7 22.7 7 88.3 4.6
23 91 55.1 23.0 6 95.3 2.5
24 91 50.8 23.0 6 89.3 4.2
25 91 39.1 17.7 6 67.8 1.3
26 91 44.3 17.7 1 70.9 .
27 91 47.8 17.5 1 74.2 .
28 91 48.2 17.5 0 .
29 91 46.8 18.2 1 76.2 .
continued on next page
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Table F.1—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
30 91 47.7 18.1 2 75.8 .
31 91 51.1 18.3 2 90.1 1.5
32 91 53.5 17.9 2 99.5 13.4
33 91 54.7 17.5 3 92.4 12.2
34 91 60.1 16.2 5 94.9 9.3
35 91 65.6 17.1 6 105.7 10.2
36 91 69.5 21.5 3 139.8 52.4
37 91 69.9 20.5 6 112.2 14.9
38 91 75.3 21.0 5 119.3 16.2
39 91 82.0 27.3 1 250.6 .
40 91 87.4 39.4 1 400.6 .
41 91 82.7 21.9 3 131.1 7.0
42 91 88.9 23.2 4 142.1 19.4
43 91 98.9 39.8 4 248.3 58.6
44 91 100.1 39.3 5 221.6 70.8
45 91 84.7 20.4 4 125.7 7.4
46 91 91.9 21.5 3 143.1 7.6
47 91 97.2 23.2 4 153.5 5.6
48 91 116.8 131.4 1 1322.9 .
49 91 96.6 26.9 2 217.1 50.7
50 91 102.3 30.3 4 201.7 44.1
continued on next page
106
Table F.1—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
51 91 110.9 49.5 4 297.3 96.6
52 91 129.1 136.5 1 1344.0 .
53 91 102.7 24.8 3 173.4 25.7
54 91 110.1 32.9 4 220.0 21.6
55 91 147.8 213.7 2 1391.4 859.3
56 91 170.4 280.6 2 1995.5 4.9
57 91 118.4 47.7 4 288.7 90.0
58 91 147.1 203.7 1 1999.0 .
59 91 186.3 306.7 3 1777.9 383.0
60 91 187.9 269.1 3 1551.7 387.4
61 91 168.2 223.3 3 1332.4 21.3
62 91 151.5 141.0 3 723.5 528.6
63 91 177.1 240.2 2 1666.2 470.6
64 91 208.4 327.4 4 1667.9 382.4
65 91 223.4 415.0 4 1975.0 890.8
66 91 197.3 268.0 3 1554.0 385.4
67 91 188.9 268.1 3 1564.9 376.1
68 91 210.0 310.1 5 1436.0 322.7
69 91 174.2 259.7 3 1499.5 440.6
70 91 163.1 238.4 2 1666.2 470.6
71 91 141.9 201.3 1 1999.0 .
continued on next page
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Table F.1—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
72 91 120.7 42.9 7 223.0 42.7
73 91 177.5 296.8 3 1712.1 433.0
74 91 116.2 37.5 7 203.8 33.2
75 91 107.5 30.5 6 179.8 19.3
76 91 102.8 27.6 5 170.6 14.0
77 91 118.1 121.3 1 1227.2 .
78 91 99.4 23.4 4 143.8 10.9
79 91 94.8 22.8 4 138.8 13.8
80 91 91.7 21.5 3 132.5 4.9
81 91 107.9 131.4 1 1329.5 .
82 91 92.3 20.3 3 131.5 4.9
83 91 92.5 19.4 3 130.9 7.1
84 91 92.8 18.7 3 125.0 1.6
85 91 96.4 21.1 3 139.6 17.6
86 91 93.1 20.8 3 131.8 4.3
87 91 88.6 20.4 2 123.4 4.9
88 91 82.5 20.4 4 116.3 2.0
89 91 195.0 325.8 3 1842.2 456.8
90 91 98.7 22.9 5 145.3 12.2
91 91 90.3 19.4 2 122.6 3.6
92 91 84.4 17.8 4 112.1 0.6
continued on next page
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Table F.1—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
93 91 97.5 39.5 3 254.0 117.8
94 91 85.2 19.2 7 117.7 3.9
95 91 78.6 18.2 7 109.1 .
96 91 71.7 18.0 7 103.2 2.8
Table F.2—Days Selected by Interval: North Congestion Zone
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
1 91 91.3 38.6 3 252.1 83.4
2 91 80.4 19.8 6 121.1 6.5
3 91 72.3 19.8 5 111.9 5.5
4 91 67.8 20.1 4 108.4 2.1
5 91 71.9 22.4 8 116.9 5.2
6 91 69.4 21.3 7 114.4 5.8
7 91 67.6 19.2 7 108.5 6.5
8 91 65.1 18.8 8 104.1 8.4
9 91 63.8 20.7 8 106.8 9.7
10 91 60.6 21.4 8 104.9 10.9
11 91 56.9 21.1 8 99.4 7.6
12 91 54.5 20.8 8 95.1 8.1
continued on next page
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Table F.2—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
13 91 52.3 21.8 7 95.7 7.9
14 91 49.8 21.6 6 93.3 7.8
15 91 48.7 21.3 7 91.6 4.9
16 91 46.2 21.8 7 90.7 4.0
17 91 45.5 21.7 7 92.1 3.8
18 91 45.7 21.3 7 91.6 4.2
19 91 47.3 20.5 8 87.5 7.2
20 91 48.0 20.8 7 88.2 5.4
21 91 46.2 22.5 9 86.5 5.9
22 91 48.5 22.6 7 88.3 4.6
23 91 55.0 23.0 6 95.3 2.6
24 91 50.8 22.9 6 89.3 4.2
25 91 39.0 17.8 6 67.8 1.3
26 91 44.3 17.7 0 . .
27 91 47.8 17.5 0 . .
28 91 48.1 17.7 0 . .
29 91 46.7 18.4 1 76.0 .
30 91 47.5 18.3 1 76.7 .
31 91 50.8 18.7 2 90.0 1.4
32 91 53.2 18.3 2 99.3 13.2
33 91 54.5 17.8 3 92.3 12.1
continued on next page
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Table F.2—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
34 91 60.1 16.2 5 94.8 9.3
35 91 65.6 17.1 6 105.7 10.2
36 91 69.5 21.5 3 139.8 52.4
37 91 69.9 20.5 6 112.2 14.9
38 91 74.9 20.7 5 119.3 16.2
39 91 81.6 27.2 1 250.6 .
40 91 87.0 39.4 1 400.6 .
41 91 82.6 21.8 3 131.1 7.0
42 91 88.6 23.0 4 142.1 19.4
43 91 98.6 39.7 4 248.3 58.6
44 91 99.8 39.3 5 221.6 70.8
45 91 83.9 20.2 5 122.4 8.8
46 91 90.5 21.5 3 143.1 7.6
47 91 94.8 22.3 4 148.7 13.0
48 91 101.4 30.7 5 195.6 30.1
49 91 94.2 27.2 2 217.1 50.7
50 91 98.8 31.4 4 201.7 44.1
51 91 106.7 49.9 4 297.3 96.6
52 91 111.5 43.7 5 252.1 53.5
53 91 100.0 24.4 4 164.9 27.1
54 91 106.0 29.4 3 209.8 8.6
continued on next page
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Table F.2—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
55 91 137.7 203.1 1 1999.0 .
56 91 167.3 281.0 2 1995.5 4.9
57 91 115.4 47.1 4 288.7 90.0
58 91 143.1 204.0 1 1999.0 .
59 91 168.3 282.0 2 1999.0 0.0
60 91 156.1 207.6 1 1999.0 .
61 91 123.4 55.6 5 314.4 83.6
62 91 129.6 61.0 5 339.3 76.6
63 91 154.5 206.3 1 1999.0 .
64 91 171.2 280.3 2 1999.0 0.0
65 91 154.2 203.1 1 1999.0 .
66 91 158.4 204.4 1 1999.0 .
67 91 153.3 203.7 1 1999.0 .
68 91 152.4 203.8 1 1999.0 .
69 91 141.5 202.7 1 1999.0 .
70 91 142.3 204.0 1 1999.0 .
71 91 134.7 201.4 1 1999.0 .
72 91 111.5 35.3 5 210.7 48.8
73 91 157.0 276.5 2 1961.8 52.6
74 91 109.0 33.4 4 211.9 45.1
75 91 102.0 25.4 3 168.1 37.0
continued on next page
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Table F.2—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
76 91 98.0 22.5 2 152.8 22.4
77 91 101.8 27.5 2 203.9 69.5
78 91 96.0 21.2 3 131.0 4.5
79 91 91.5 20.5 3 126.3 2.3
80 91 88.3 19.9 2 120.6 1.6
81 91 91.5 20.9 2 141.2 11.4
82 91 89.4 18.9 2 127.4 9.4
83 91 89.1 18.0 4 120.5 6.4
84 91 89.8 17.7 4 119.4 2.9
85 91 92.6 20.4 4 135.1 16.8
86 91 89.2 21.0 3 125.5 7.6
87 91 84.8 20.7 2 116.0 0.1
88 91 78.6 20.4 4 111.6 1.9
89 91 177.8 303.5 2 2099.5 142.1
90 91 96.5 23.2 6 143.1 12.1
91 91 88.2 19.6 4 120.2 3.4
92 91 83.2 19.1 2 112.5 0.1
93 91 95.3 40.2 3 254.0 117.8
94 91 82.9 21.3 6 118.3 3.8
95 91 76.1 20.9 6 108.9 1.2
96 91 69.2 20.8 5 104.3 2.2
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Table F.3—Days Selected by Interval: South Congestion Zone
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
1 91 114.8 207.6 1 2038.4 .
2 91 82.9 22.6 6 133.8 16.5
3 91 75.3 19.7 7 113.6 6.0
4 91 70.1 20.1 6 109.8 7.6
5 91 75.7 24.2 10 123.2 14.4
6 91 71.5 22.1 10 114.7 6.5
7 91 68.5 21.1 9 113.1 10.9
8 91 65.5 19.7 9 105.8 7.9
9 91 64.1 21.2 9 106.6 9.1
10 91 60.7 21.9 9 104.7 10.1
11 91 56.9 21.5 9 99.6 7.0
12 91 54.8 21.1 9 96.3 6.9
13 91 52.6 21.9 8 96.0 6.8
14 91 50.2 21.8 7 93.1 6.7
15 91 49.0 21.3 8 90.3 5.8
16 91 46.7 21.8 7 90.7 4.0
17 91 46.1 21.7 8 91.4 4.1
18 91 45.8 21.4 8 90.0 5.9
19 91 47.4 20.6 8 87.5 7.2
20 91 48.2 21.0 6 89.6 4.3
21 91 46.3 22.7 9 86.5 5.9
continued on next page
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Table F.3—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
22 91 48.7 22.7 7 88.3 4.6
23 91 54.9 22.9 6 94.7 3.2
24 91 50.7 22.8 5 90.0 4.4
25 91 39.0 17.5 5 67.9 1.5
26 91 44.1 17.6 0 . .
27 91 47.6 17.5 0 . .
28 91 48.0 17.4 0 . .
29 91 46.7 18.1 1 74.0 .
30 91 47.5 17.8 1 74.8 .
31 91 51.1 18.0 2 88.3 0.9
32 91 53.4 17.6 2 97.5 10.6
33 91 54.6 17.3 3 91.4 10.5
34 91 59.9 16.2 5 94.8 9.1
35 91 65.4 17.1 6 105.7 10.2
36 91 69.4 21.5 3 139.8 52.4
37 91 69.8 20.4 7 110.2 14.4
38 91 75.3 21.5 6 121.4 15.3
39 91 82.0 27.6 2 190.5 85.0
40 91 87.3 39.6 1 400.6 .
41 91 82.5 21.7 4 127.1 9.8
42 91 88.7 23.1 5 138.5 18.6
continued on next page
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Table F.3—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
43 91 98.8 39.9 4 248.3 58.6
44 91 100.0 39.4 5 221.6 70.8
45 91 84.9 21.0 5 129.1 6.5
46 91 92.5 22.4 5 139.7 7.2
47 91 98.6 25.4 5 158.8 18.6
48 91 127.8 226.4 1 2243.3 .
49 91 98.0 28.4 4 181.3 50.9
50 91 104.5 33.2 5 206.3 30.2
51 91 113.6 52.2 4 314.2 73.6
52 91 142.0 230.7 1 2263.5 .
53 91 104.6 26.8 5 166.8 20.9
54 91 113.1 42.3 4 254.9 90.4
55 91 155.2 237.7 2 1662.9 475.4
56 91 172.1 280.4 2 1995.5 4.9
57 91 120.2 48.9 4 293.6 83.1
58 91 150.0 204.0 1 1999.0 .
59 91 199.0 356.0 3 2084.5 148.1
60 91 211.6 370.8 3 2167.0 145.6
61 91 201.7 385.9 3 2256.6 21.5
62 91 166.9 233.3 1 2253.6 .
63 91 192.9 302.4 2 2126.3 180.0
continued on next page
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Table F.3—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
64 91 235.4 415.1 4 2129.4 150.6
65 91 252.7 507.7 4 2514.1 692.9
66 91 226.4 373.5 3 2169.3 147.5
67 91 215.5 371.9 3 2180.3 157.8
68 91 253.2 466.2 5 2155.8 143.3
69 91 197.7 355.1 3 2081.7 148.5
70 91 177.5 300.2 2 2126.1 179.8
71 91 146.0 202.1 1 1999.0 .
72 91 125.1 50.4 9 244.2 36.7
73 91 190.3 334.6 3 1962.9 85.1
74 91 120.1 43.2 8 221.4 30.0
75 91 110.2 35.7 6 205.0 23.5
76 91 105.1 32.3 5 189.4 36.4
77 91 130.0 206.8 1 2054.2 .
78 91 101.6 27.0 7 155.8 16.0
79 91 97.0 26.2 5 153.2 22.7
80 91 93.9 24.6 6 142.6 7.7
81 91 119.9 227.1 1 2249.4 .
82 91 94.2 23.0 8 135.7 8.7
83 91 94.7 22.9 6 140.9 15.7
84 91 94.8 21.7 6 137.7 9.2
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Table F.3—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
85 91 98.9 24.8 8 147.0 7.6
86 91 95.8 24.5 7 143.4 7.0
87 91 91.2 23.9 6 138.2 9.8
88 91 85.1 24.3 6 134.8 18.6
89 91 207.8 372.4 3 2148.9 132.0
90 91 100.3 24.2 5 148.7 9.7
91 91 91.8 20.9 2 134.1 12.7
92 91 85.2 18.4 1 121.1 .
93 91 98.9 40.3 4 230.7 106.8
94 91 86.8 20.2 4 122.8 3.6
95 91 80.2 19.0 6 114.0 6.0
96 91 73.4 18.5 6 105.4 3.3
Table F.4—Days Selected by Interval: West Congestion Zone
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
1 91 81.4 52.4 3 266.3 58.8
2 91 71.9 34.6 3 125.7 2.2
3 91 64.5 42.7 1 299.0 .
4 91 61.6 40.6 1 299.0 .
continued on next page
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Table F.4—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
5 91 65.4 32.7 5 119.4 4.7
6 91 62.4 32.5 5 117.2 3.8
7 91 60.1 30.8 4 113.1 4.6
8 91 55.8 33.0 3 113.4 4.0
9 91 54.0 35.2 3 117.7 5.6
10 91 50.2 35.6 4 113.4 8.7
11 91 46.4 34.5 3 108.4 1.8
12 91 43.8 33.2 5 99.9 6.0
13 91 42.5 33.3 5 99.4 5.8
14 91 42.3 31.4 4 97.7 4.8
15 91 41.4 29.9 7 91.6 4.9
16 91 38.8 30.2 7 90.7 4.0
17 91 41.6 42.4 1 326.5 .
18 91 41.7 42.2 1 326.5 .
19 91 43.1 42.2 1 326.5 .
20 91 44.3 41.9 1 326.5 .
21 91 41.3 28.5 5 90.8 4.3
22 91 43.3 28.3 4 91.2 4.0
23 91 47.8 30.9 4 96.2 2.8
24 91 43.9 30.4 2 94.6 1.4
25 91 32.4 25.9 0 . .
continued on next page
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Table F.4—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
26 91 38.0 26.2 0 . .
27 91 40.9 27.4 0 . .
28 91 40.0 28.8 0 . .
29 91 40.3 28.0 0 . .
30 91 40.1 28.8 0 . .
31 91 42.6 29.1 1 89.0 .
32 91 44.3 28.9 1 90.0 .
33 91 48.8 25.3 0
34 91 54.1 26.5 1 97.1 .
35 91 58.4 29.7 3 112.4 10.7
36 91 63.2 31.1 2 156.6 61.6
37 91 63.8 29.1 2 127.3 20.2
38 91 68.0 30.4 3 126.3 18.4
39 91 73.0 38.7 1 250.6 .
40 91 75.5 51.0 1 400.6 .
41 91 70.8 38.3 2 133.9 7.0
42 91 76.6 40.9 2 156.8 15.8
43 91 85.1 55.1 4 248.3 58.6
44 91 84.6 56.5 3 258.8 69.7
45 91 69.8 40.9 1 133.8 .
46 91 79.0 40.7 2 147.5 0.8
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Table F.4—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
47 91 83.5 41.2 3 154.6 6.3
48 91 91.0 46.2 4 206.4 20.9
49 91 86.9 38.9 2 217.1 50.7
50 91 92.2 41.3 3 218.2 35.8
51 91 102.4 54.2 4 297.3 96.6
52 91 106.6 50.6 5 252.1 53.5
53 91 94.8 34.0 3 173.4 25.7
54 91 100.8 37.1 3 209.8 8.6
55 91 131.3 205.8 1 1999.0 .
56 91 161.4 283.5 2 1995.5 4.9
57 91 110.3 54.1 3 321.2 76.1
58 91 137.3 206.7 1 1999.0 .
59 91 163.5 284.2 2 1999.0 0.0
60 91 151.5 210.4 1 1999.0 .
61 91 119.0 65.0 6 298.4 84.4
62 91 122.8 68.7 5 339.3 76.6
63 91 147.3 209.5 1 1999.0 .
64 91 165.3 283.2 2 1999.0 0.0
65 91 149.7 206.9 1 1999.0 .
66 91 152.2 207.7 1 1999.0 .
67 91 146.9 206.6 1 1999.0 .
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Table F.4—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
68 91 150.4 205.5 1 1999.0 .
69 91 137.5 204.9 1 1999.0 .
70 91 137.0 206.2 1 1999.0 .
71 91 126.6 204.8 1 1999.0 .
72 91 103.2 47.3 4 220.1 50.9
73 91 130.5 206.9 1 1999.0 .
74 91 100.7 45.9 3 228.1 38.4
75 91 92.2 41.4 1 210.5 .
76 91 87.3 40.9 1 168.6 .
77 91 92.0 46.4 2 233.6 27.5
78 91 83.4 41.2 0 . .
79 91 79.8 39.0 0 . .
80 91 76.7 38.2 0 . .
81 91 79.8 40.1 1 149.3 .
82 91 77.9 38.7 0 . .
83 91 78.7 36.2 0 . .
84 91 80.1 35.7 0 . .
85 91 84.0 37.1 1 160.0 .
86 91 80.0 36.4 0 . .
87 91 73.7 37.4 0 . .
88 91 67.0 36.9 0 . .
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Table F.4—Continued
Whole Sample Selected Sample
Interval Days Mean Std. Dev. Days Mean Std. Dev.
89 91 173.3 305.5 2 2099.5 142.1
90 91 92.7 30.4 3 152.6 9.8
91 91 85.3 26.3 1 125.2 .
92 91 77.3 29.5 0 . .
93 91 87.8 49.4 3 254.0 117.8
94 91 77.2 31.8 1 126.0 .
95 91 69.6 31.9 0 . .
96 91 62.0 31.6 0 . .
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APPENDIX G
3-DIGIT NAICS DEFINITION
• NAICS 541: Industries in the Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
subsector group establishments engaged in processes where human capital is
the major input. These establishments make available the knowledge and skills
of their employees, often on an assignment basis, where an individual or team is
responsible for the delivery of services to the client. The individual industries of
this subsector are defined on the basis of the particular expertise and training of
the services provider. The distinguishing feature of the Professional, Scientific,
and Technical Services subsector is the fact that most of the industries grouped
in it have production processes that are almost wholly dependent on worker
skills. In most of these industries, equipment and materials are not of major
importance, unlike health care, for example, where high tech machines and
materials are important collaborating inputs to labor skills in the production of
health care. Thus, the establishments classified in this subsector sell expertise.
Much of the expertise requires degrees, though not in every case.
• NAICS 311: Industries in the Food Manufacturing subsector transform livestock
and agricultural products into products for intermediate or final consumption.
The industry groups are distinguished by the raw materials (generally of animal
or vegetable origin) processed into food products. The food products manufac-
tured in these establishments are typically sold to wholesalers or retailers for
distribution to consumers, but establishments primarily engaged in retailing
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bakery and candy products made on the premises not for immediate consump-
tion are included. Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing beverages
are classified in Subsector 312, Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing.
• NAICS 325: The Chemical Manufacturing subsector is based on the transfor-
mation of organic and inorganic raw materials by a chemical process and the
formulation of products. This subsector distinguishes the production of basic
chemicals that comprise the first industry group from the production of inter-
mediate and end products produced by further processing of basic chemicals
that make up the remaining industry groups. This subsector does not include
all industries transforming raw materials by a chemical process. It is common
for some chemical processing to occur during mining operations. These bene-
ficiating operations, such as copper concentrating, are classified in Sector 21,
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction. Furthermore, the refining of
crude petroleum is included in Subsector 324, Petroleum and Coal Products
Manufacturing. In addition, the manufacturing of aluminum oxide is included
in Subsector 331, Primary Metal Manufacturing; and beverage distilleries are
classified in Subsector 312, Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing. As
in the case of these two activities, the grouping of industries into subsectors
may take into account the association of the activities performed with other
activities in the subsector.
• NAICS 621: Industries in the Ambulatory Health Care Services subsector pro-
vide health care services directly or indirectly to ambulatory patients and do
not usually provide inpatient services. Health practitioners in this subsector
provide outpatient services, with the facilities and equipment not usually being
the most significant part of the production process.
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• NAICS 424: Industries in the Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods sub-
sector sell nondurable goods to other businesses. Nondurable goods are items
generally with a normal life expectancy of less than three years. Nondurable
goods merchant wholesale trade establishments are engaged in wholesaling prod-
ucts, such as paper and paper products, chemicals and chemical products,
drugs, textiles and textile products, apparel, footwear, groceries, farm prod-
ucts, petroleum and petroleum products, alcoholic beverages, books, magazines,
newspapers, flowers and nursery stock, and tobacco products. The detailed in-
dustries within the subsector are organized in the classification structure based
on the products sold. Business to business electronic markets, agents, and bro-
kers primarily engaged in wholesaling nondurable goods, generally on a commis-
sion or fee basis, are classified in Subsector 425, Wholesale Electronic Markets
and Agents and Brokers.
• NAICS 522: Industries in the Credit Intermediation and Related Activities
subsector group establishments that (1) lend funds raised from depositors; (2)
lend funds raised from credit market borrowing; or (3) facilitate the lending of
funds or issuance of credit by engaging in such activities as mortgage and loan
brokerage, clearinghouse and reserve services, and check cashing services.
• NAICS 423: Industries in the Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods subsector
sell capital or durable goods to other businesses. Merchant wholesalers generally
take title to the goods that they sell; in other words, they buy and sell goods on
their own account. Durable goods are new or used items generally with a normal
life expectancy of three years or more. Durable goods merchant wholesale trade
establishments are engaged in wholesaling products, such as motor vehicles, fur-
niture, construction materials, machinery and equipment (including household-
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type appliances), metals and minerals (except petroleum), sporting goods, toys
and hobby goods, recyclable materials, and parts. Business-to-business elec-
tronic markets, agents, and brokers primarily engaged in wholesaling durable
goods, generally on a commission or fee basis, are classified in Subsector 425,
Wholesale Electronic Markets and Agents and Brokers.
• NAICS 326: Industries in the Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing
subsector make goods by processing plastics materials and raw rubber. The
core technology employed by establishments in this subsector is that of plastics
or rubber product production. Plastics and rubber are combined in the same
subsector because plastics are increasingly being used as a substitute for rub-
ber; however the subsector is generally restricted to the production of products
made of just one material, either solely plastics or rubber. Many manufacturing
activities use plastics or rubber, for example the manufacture of footwear, or fur-
niture. Typically, the production process of these products involves more than
one material. In these cases, technologies that allow disparate materials to be
formed and combined are of central importance in describing the manufacturing
activity. In NAICS, such activities (the footwear and furniture manufacturing)
are not classified in the Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing subsec-
tor because the core technologies for these activities are diverse and involve
multiple materials. Within the Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing
subsector, a distinction is made between plastics and rubber products at the in-
dustry group level, although it is not a rigid distinction, as can be seen from the
definition of Industry 32622, Rubber and Plastics Hoses and Belting Manufac-
turing. As materials technology progresses, plastics are increasingly being used
as a substitute for rubber; and eventually, the distinction may disappear as a
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basis for establishment classification. In keeping with the core technology focus
of plastics, lamination of plastics film to plastics film as well as the production
of bags from plastics only is classified in this subsector. Lamination and bag
production involving plastics and materials other than plastics are classified in
the NAICS Subsector 322, Paper Manufacturing.
• NAICS 812: Industries in the Personal and Laundry Services subsector group
establishments that provide personal and laundry services to individuals, house-
holds, and businesses. Services performed include: personal care services; death
care services; laundry and drycleaning services; and a wide range of other per-
sonal services, such as pet care (except veterinary) services, photofinishing ser-
vices, temporary parking services, and dating services. The Personal and Laun-
dry Services subsector is by no means all-inclusive of the services that could be
termed personal services (i.e., those provided to individuals rather than busi-
nesses). There are many other subsectors, as well as sectors, that provide services
to persons. Establishments providing legal, accounting, tax preparation, archi-
tectural, portrait photography, and similar professional services are classified
in Sector 54, Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services; those providing
job placement, travel arrangement, home security, interior and exterior house
cleaning, exterminating, lawn and garden care, and similar support services are
classified in Sector 56, Administrative and Support, Waste Management and
Remediation Services; those providing health and social services are classified
in Sector 62, Health Care and Social Assistance; those providing amusement
and recreation services are classified in Sector 71, Arts, Entertainment and
Recreation; those providing educational instruction are classified in Sector 61,
Educational Services; those providing repair services are classified in Subsector
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811, Repair and Maintenance; and those providing spiritual, civic, and advo-
cacy services are classified in Subsector 813, Religious, Grantmaking, Civic,
Professional, and Similar Organizations.
• NAICS 722: Industries in the Food Services and Drinking Places subsector pre-
pare meals, snacks, and beverages to customer order for immediate on-premises
and off-premises consumption. There is a wide range of establishments in these
industries. Some provide food and drink only; while others provide various
combinations of seating space, waiter/waitress services and incidental ameni-
ties, such as limited entertainment. The industries in the subsector are grouped
based on the type and level of services provided. The industry groups are full-
service restaurants; limited-service eating places; special food services, such as
food service contractors, caterers, and mobile food services; and drinking places.
Food and beverage services at hotels and motels; amusement parks, theaters,
casinos, country clubs, and similar recreational facilities; and civic and social
organizations are included in this subsector only if these services are provided
by a separate establishment primarily engaged in providing food and beverage
services.
• NAICS 331: Industries in the Primary Metal Manufacturing subsector smelt
and/or refine ferrous and nonferrous metals from ore, pig or scrap, using elec-
trometallurgical and other process metallurgical techniques. Establishments in
this subsector also manufacture metal alloys and superalloys by introducing
other chemical elements to pure metals. The output of smelting and refining,
usually in ingot form, is used in rolling, drawing, and extruding operations to
make sheet, strip, bar, rod, or wire, and in molten form to make castings and
other basic metal products. Primary manufacturing of ferrous and nonferrous
129
metals begins with ore or concentrate as the primary input. Establishments
manufacturing primary metals from ore and/or concentrate remain classified in
the primary smelting, primary refining, or iron and steel mill industries regard-
less of the form of their output. Establishments primarily engaged in secondary
smelting and/or secondary refining recover ferrous and nonferrous metals from
scrap and/or dross. The output of the secondary smelting and/or secondary
refining industries is limited to shapes, such as ingot or billet, that will be fur-
ther processed. Recovery of metals from scrap often occurs in establishments
that are primarily engaged in activities, such as rolling, drawing, extruding, or
similar processes. Excluded from the Primary Metal Manufacturing subsector
are establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing ferrous and nonferrous
forgings (except ferrous forgings made in steel mills) and stampings. Although
forging, stamping, and casting are all methods used to make metal shapes, forg-
ing and stamping do not use molten metals and are included in Subsector 332,
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing. Establishments primarily engaged in
operating coke ovens are classified in Industry 32419, Other Petroleum and Coal
Products Manufacturing.
130
VITA
Cesar Alfredo Theodoro Cancho Diez was born in Lima, Peru, in 1978. He re-
ceived his Bachelor’s degree in Social Sciences with mention in Economics from the
Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru in 2003. He was awarded the Fulbright Schol-
arship for doctoral studies in 2005, and entered the graduate program in Economics at
Texas A&M University in August 2006. He received his Doctor of Philosophy degree
in August 2012. Under the supervision of Dr. Steven L. Puller, his research inter-
ests include empirical industrial organization, applied microeconometrics, and labor
economics.
Dr. Cancho may be reached at The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, MSN MC7-
703, Washington, DC, 20433, USA. His email address is ccancho@worldbank.org.
